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ome innovative technologies catch on, while others fail.1  There is 
a temptation to view such failures as simply the operation of 
markets: good innovations thrive and bad innovations die.  But in the 
real world, a success story (or failure) is not always so simple, and 
adopting new technologies is not always simply a matter of improved 
efficiencies.  Seemingly superior technologies can fail in the 
marketplace for any number of reasons.  Perhaps the most important 
of these is the need for social acceptance of the technology, 
particularly in markets characterized by network effects. 
Network effects exist where a product’s value turns on how many 
others use it.  One classic example is the fax machine: such a machine 
is far more valuable when there are many users as opposed to only a 
few users.  Many modern technologies have this same characteristic.  
High-definition (HD) television sets are only worthwhile to viewers if 
there are others broadcasting programs in HD.  Consumers cannot use 
cell phones to make payments unless merchants adopt the technology 
to allow such payments.  Because the value of the product to the user 
 
∗ Associate Dean, Professor of Law and Director of the Gibbons Institute of Law, 
Science & Technology, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., University of Virginia; 
B.S. and B.A., Stanford University. 
∗∗ Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., University of 
Wisconsin; B.A., Cornell University.  We would like to thank Jake Barnes, Matt Bodie, 
Stephen Lubben, Dan Solove, and Charlie Sullivan for providing helpful comments on 
prior drafts of this Article, and we are indebted to participants in a panel at the 2005 Law 
and Society Association Annual Meeting, as well as attendees at the Annual Meeting of 
the 2006 Canadian Law and Economics Association.  We would also like to acknowledge 
the hard work of our research assistants, Sydney Peck, Randall Samson, and Alison 
Weyer, and the Dean’s Summer Grant Fund for its generous support. 
1 See G. Pascal Zachary, The Risk of Innovation: Will Anyone Embrace It?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 2008, § 2 (Business), at 4. 
S 
 582 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 581 
turns on whether other people use it, social acceptance plays a large 
role in markets with network effects. 
Network effects are even more complicated in what are known as 
multi-sided platforms: in these markets, the product is used by two 
different types of users, say Group A and Group B.  The product’s 
value to users in Group A turns not on how many others are in Group 
A, but instead on how many are in Group B — and vice versa.  HD 
televisions and cell phone payments are multi-sided platforms, as are 
dating clubs like e-Harmony.  For the club (“platform”) to be 
successful, it needs both male and female members: the value of the 
club to male members (Group A) depends on the number of female 
members (Group B).  In multi-sided platforms, as in other networks, 
social acceptance is crucial to a new product’s success.  Here the 
challenge is more difficult, however, because the product can only 
succeed if adopted by groups on opposite sides of the platform. 
Given the importance of getting others to buy into a new product, 
innovators have a strong incentive to take steps to obtain early 
adoption of a new technology.  This problem is even more 
complicated in multi-sided platforms where innovators need to obtain 
adopters on both sides of the platform.  Providers of such new 
technologies have an obvious incentive to seek government support in 
their goal of obtaining social acceptance; this is no doubt even more 
true for products in which innovators have made large investments.  If 
an entrepreneur can get the government to help ease the costs of 
adopting the technology, or even mandate its acceptance, the network 
effects problem can be minimized or even eliminated. 
Governments, of course, will always intervene in markets.  For our 
country’s entire history, government action — both direct and 
indirect —has affected what technologies will be adopted.  
Whether — a nd, if so, how and when — the government should 
intervene in a particular market is a tricky question. 
In this Article, we use examples from the payment industry to 
argue that the government usually should not intervene to aid new 
technologies.  Payments provide a particularly rich lens through 
which to examine the question of government intervention.  All 
payment systems are in essence a multi-sided platform.  Even a gold 
or silver coin— w hat the Framers would have called specie — is of no 
value to a purchaser unless a seller is willing to exchange her goods 
or services for that coin.  The U.S. government has long acted in ways 
designed to make us accept or reject certain kinds of payments.  For 
example, although we now consider Federal Reserve notes (dollar 
 2008] Government Intervention in Emerging Networked Technologies 583 
bills) a legitimate medium of exchange, consumers and merchants 
were reluctant to accept such notes and their predecessors for much of 
our nation’s history.  As we will discuss, the government solved this 
problem during the Civil War by mandating that creditors accept U.S. 
notes.2  Today Title 31, § 5103 of the U.S. Code provides that Federal 
Reserve notes “are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, 
and dues.”3  As a result, all public and private creditors are required to 
accept federal currency in payment of debts, subject to reasonable 
limits on the time and means of payment.4 
The government also indirectly supports other payment systems.  
For example, extensive legislation and regulation supports the 
checking system.  Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
along with an array of federal laws and regulations, set the basic 
terms for most check transactions, while the Federal Reserve itself 
has long acted as a cornerstone in the check collection process.  These 
kinds of government actions make checks more attractive to use.  For 
both payments and other technologies, government support for the 
implementation of, or the infrastructure for, a particular technology 
may shift consumer choices toward that system. 
Payments are also useful for examining the question of government 
intervention.  Over the past few decades the number of new products 
has been staggering.  Not only have financial institutions introduced 
credit cards and debit cards, but also stored value cards, payroll cards, 
electronic money, electronic checks, and automated clearing house 
transactions, all of which have lessened the need for cash and checks.  
Recently, cell phone payments have become the subject of marketing 
experiments in places like Atlanta.  In Japan, this technology is 
already used every day by hundreds of thousands of people.  Other 
payment providers have begun to push systems that would operate 
through small electronic transmitters kept on key chains.  Some 
providers have even started to introduce payment through biometric 
devices that would identify payers through fingerprints or other 
 
2 See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
3 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2002). 
4 See, e.g., Nemser v. New York City Transit Auth., 530 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1988) (holding 
that, although the Transit Authority was required to accept fare payments in U.S. currency, 
the Transit Authority could impose reasonable restrictions on when and where it would 
collect such currency and that, therefore, requiring the use of a token to pay a fare was 
permissible).  In fact, the current understanding of the legal tender statute is that it applies 
only to preexisting debts and that parties to an exchange need not agree to take cash.  
James Steven Rogers, The New Old Law of Electronic Money, 58 SMU L. REV. 1253, 
1276 (2005). 
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physical characteristics.  Some experts predict that cell phone 
payments alone will grow from $3.2 billion in 2003 to $37 billion in 
2008.5 
Of course, the open question is whether these new payment 
methods will become as ubiquitous as credit cards or whether they 
will go the way of the two-dollar bill.  The answer depends on 
whether users can be convinced to adopt the new systems.  For that to 
happen, the new systems must be both more profitable for merchants 
than their existing systems and preferable to consumers over old 
systems.6  Many new technologies, when faced with network effects, 
are unable to satisfy both conditions.  The crucial questions we 
investigate are whether, and when, it is appropriate and possible for 
the government to help tilt the scale in favor of new technologies. 
We begin in Part I by describing and modeling how merchants and 
consumers decide whether to adopt and use a particular payment 
technology and then introduce the complications of network effects 
and multi-sided platforms.  In Part II, we describe the various roles 
that the government may assume vis-à-vis any new technology, 
namely, legislator, fiduciary, or seller.  Part III then discusses the 
tools that the government has available to influence public 
preferences.  Part IV argues that despite the availability of these tools, 
the government generally should not act to promote particular 
technologies. 
I 
MERCHANT AND CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
To decide whether and how the government should attempt to alter 
the choices that the public makes about new technologies, we must 
first consider how the public is likely to make such choices.  As we 
discussed in the introduction and as we show below, these choices are 
complicated by the problems of multi-sided platforms.  For instance, 
merchants are much more likely to adopt a new technology where a 
large number of consumers have shown a willingness to use that 
innovation, and consumers are much more likely to adopt the new 
technology when there are already a large number of merchants who 
 
5 A Cash Call, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2007, at 71, 71. 
6 In recent years, much literature has discussed satisfaction and maximization of 
preferences.  Most of that discussion falls well outside the scope of this Article.  For our 
present purposes, we accept that preferences are malleable. 
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have adopted it.  This gives rise to the chicken-or-the-egg problem:7 
unless both sides of the transaction can be convinced that they are 
better off with the new technology, it will not be adopted. 
To show why this is so, we must first present a model of how 
individuals make such decisions.  To make this discussion more 
concrete, we will focus primarily on payment systems.  As with other 
technologies, the decision to adopt and use a payment system occurs 
in two stages.  First, the consumer and merchants must both choose to 
adopt a payment system, or other technology, as an option.  Second, 
the consumer must decide whether to use the new payment system.8 
A.  Merchant Decision Making 
For a merchant, the decision to adopt a particular technology 
depends on whether doing so will maximize profits.9  This should 
occur when the new technology allows the merchant to maximize the 
return on its investment.  In the context of payments, this means that 
the merchant’s investment in a new payment system must exceed the 
return on other opportunities.  As an example, consider a restaurant 
owner who has to choose between spending $100 on additional 
advertising or on adopting a credit card system in which a three 
percent charge on credit card purchases will be imposed.10 
The restaurant’s profit (P) from adopting any particular payment 
system (X) is a function of both the additional revenues (AR) that the 
system will generate and the new system’s costs (C).  The new costs 
can be further subdivided into two types: start-up costs (SC), such as 
the initial fees to buy credit card processing terminals, and per-
 
7 This exists whenever payors and payees must simultaneously adopt a new technology 
for it to be successful, “otherwise there is little incentive for consumers or merchants to 
embrace the new instrument.”  Sujit Chakravorti & Emery Kobor, Why Invest in Payment 
Innovations? 7 n.12 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Emerging Payments Occasional Papers 
Series No. 2003-1B, June 2003); see also DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, 
PAYING WITH PLASTIC xiii (2d ed. 2005). 
8 There are exceptions to this general rule that the choice of the particular payment 
system will be in the hands of the consumer.  For instance, as a matter of practice, it is 
merchants rather than consumers who choose whether to convert a check to an ACH 
payment.  For an explanation of ACH payments, see RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2d ed. 2005). 
9 STANLEY FISCHER ET AL., ECONOMICS 129 (2d ed. 1988). 
10 We will treat the three percent fee as a discount on revenue rather than as an 
additional cost because the merchant never expends the fee; it is just a reduction in the 
payments the merchant receives from the credit card company. 
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transaction costs (TC),11 such as the cost of a phone call to verify a 
credit card.  This leads to the following profit function: 
 
   P(X) = AR – SC – TC (1) 
 
The owner should adopt a particular new payment system over an 
alternative technology (Y) when the new system’s profit exceeds the 
old system’s profit.  Because we are discussing alternative uses of the 
same investment, we can assume for our present purposes that the 
total costs of the alternative uses are the same.  Therefore, the owner 
should adopt a new payment system when the new system’s 
additional revenues will exceed the additional revenues that would 
have been generated by an alternative use of the investment: 
 
   AR(X) > AR(Y) (2) 
 
Using the example above, now assume that a patron’s ability to use 
a credit card will increase the restaurant’s business by $1000 and that 
the alternative investment in advertising will generate $950 in 
business.12  Finally, assume that the marginal cost of producing the 
additional food is zero.  On this account, the restaurant owner should 
invest in the credit card system because the additional revenues from 
that system exceed the additional revenues from advertising, even 
after we account for the three percent fee paid to the credit card 
company.13 
Of course, the quantity of both the start-up and per-transaction 
costs will still matter to any merchant’s decision on whether to adopt 
a new technology.  The larger those costs are, the greater the 
additional revenues have to be in order to justify the investment.  If 
 
11 By “per-transaction costs” we mean not just those costs that are charged on each 
particular transaction, but also those costs that are charged on a periodic basis, so long as 
the merchant continues to use the payment system, such as a monthly access fee.  Many 
vendors of credit card payment systems have such fixed charges associated with the 
payment system.  See, e.g., PayPal, https://www.paypal.com/cgi   -
bin/webscr?cmd=_display-pro-fees-outside (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) (noting standard 
thirty-dollar monthly fee). 
12 The claim here is that adding a credit card option for a particular merchant might 
increase sales, not that credit cards or any other payments system increases the number of 
total sales, which is a different question.  See Edmund W. Kitch, The Framing Hypothesis: 
Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?, 6 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 217, 223 (1990). 
13 That is because AR(X) = $1000 – $30 = $970, which is obviously greater than $950. 
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the start-up cost for our restaurant to adopt the new system was $200 
instead of $100, and if $200 in additional advertising would generate 
$1500 in additional revenue, then it would be quite clear that the 
restaurant should invest in advertising rather than a payment system. 
In the real world, however, we believe that a new payment 
system’s start-up costs are relatively small for many merchants, and 
therefore the additional revenue needed is also relatively small.  For 
instance, a merchant who elects to start accepting charge cards has to 
pay almost nothing to buy the technology.14  Most of the costs for 
charge card acceptance consist of monthly maintenance and rental 
fees, which we categorize as per-transaction costs.15  Thus, for 
merchants interested in a new payment system, the question is really 
whether the additional revenues of the new payment system, minus 
the per-transaction costs, exceed the alternative profits that could have 
been generated by those same costs. 
There are two final caveats we should mention.  First, in many 
cases, a new payment system will not increase revenues to the same 
extent that it might initially appear.  Returning again to our restaurant 
example, while the restaurant may generate an additional $1000 in 
business, its consumers may all begin paying with credit cards.  If so, 
the actual amount of additional revenue is only $820, and the 
restaurant should instead spend the money on advertising, which 
would generate $950 in revenue.  This is obviously true of other 
technologies as well.  For instance, broadcasters contemplating 
increased revenues from HD have to discount for decreased revenue 
from analog or other traditional broadcasts. 
Second, and more importantly, we need to emphasize that not all 
costs — and perhaps not all “revenue”— m ay be financial or even 
quantifiable.  For example, one such potential nonfinancial cost is the 
hassle cost associated with adopting and using any new technology.16  
 
14 Professor Ronald Mann estimates that the equipment costs are at most a few hundred 
dollars.  See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 30 (2006). 
15 There are also, of course, the per-transaction fees, but as we noted above, see supra 
note 10, we view these as a discount on additional revenues, rather than as a cost. 
16 See Dan Ariely & José Silva, The Macro-Effects of Micro-Pricing: Behavioral 
Effects of Payment Methods and the Effectiveness of Micro-Pricing (Mar. 30, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting the existence of hassle).  Hassle 
costs, as we are using the term, are similar to switching costs, but the two are not the same.  
See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE 
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 104 (1999).  We are assuming here that investment in one 
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In the case of payment systems, merchants have to account for the 
time and effort that employees have to spend learning a new payment 
system (a start-up hassle cost) in addition to the time and effort they 
spend using the system, for example, running a credit card through a 
reader and then printing out the receipt (a per-transaction hassle cost).  
This investment of time and effort on the part of employees is a real 
cost to merchants because they could have spent the time and effort 
on training employees to provide better service (in the case of the 
start-up cost) or on providing more timely delivery of another 
patron’s meal to her table (in the case of the per-transaction cost). 
More speculatively, a merchant may adopt a new technology not 
just because of the revenues that will result, but because of the status 
that she thinks it will bring her; the restaurant might start accepting 
credit cards because the owner wants to be seen as “high-end.”  
Similarly, a television network may begin broadcasting in HD not just 
because of additional revenues, but to be seen as “cutting edge.”  This 
obviously requires departing from the assumption of the merchant as 
a simple profit-maximizer, but we believe such a departure may be 
warranted for at least some subsets of merchants.17 
B. Consumer Decisions to Adopt a Technology 
Consumers’ decisions about whether to adopt a new technology—
such as HDTV or a payment system — a re similar, but not identical, to 
those of merchants.  One difference is that consumers, unlike 
merchants, may not view the start-up costs associated with the 
adoption of a new technology as trivial, particularly when they are 
unfamiliar with it.  Consider E-ZPass, a form of payment used on 
highways in the Northeast and the Midwest.  In the E-ZPass system, a 
customer sets up an account with an E-ZPass member organization.  
Customers usually fund and periodically refill the account with a 
credit card, although some customers use cash or checks.  Assuming 
that the account has money, the customer may pay her tolls on any E-
 
payment system technology does not preclude investment in another such technology; 
therefore, no switch needs to be made. 
17 At least one commentator suggested to us that a merchant may need to offer a credit 
card option not to increase revenues, but to maintain revenues when competitors start to 
accept credit cards.  We believe that this is a distinction without a difference.  At any given 
time, the question for the restaurant is whether the additional revenues from adding a 
credit card option, discounted to present value, exceed the discounted additional revenues 
that would be generated from an alternative investment.  When a merchant offers a credit 
card payment option to stave off defections by customers, this is additional revenue 
because without the credit card option there would be lower revenues in the future. 
 2008] Government Intervention in Emerging Networked Technologies 589 
ZPass participating highway by an automatic signal from a radio 
frequency identification (“RFID”) transponder.  Adopting       E-
ZPass involves a good deal of hassle start-up costs: the customer must 
fill out an application, mail it in or submit it online, receive back the 
RFID transponder, and then attach the transponder to the car.18  
Furthermore, if the customer does not use a credit card, the funding of 
the E-ZPass account with cash or checks involves some additional 
hassle costs.19 
Just as a merchant seeks to maximize profits in its investment 
decisions, a consumer seeks to maximize her expected utility (EU), 
which is a function of the benefits (B) and costs (C) of any particular 
decision she makes: 
 
   EU(A) = B(A) – C(A) (3) 
 
Assuming that n and f are alternative payment systems, a consumer 
should pick the new system (n) when the expected utility of that 
system exceeds the expected utility of the former system (f) such that: 
 




   B(n) – C(n) > B(f) – C(f) (5) 
 
As we saw in the previous section, costs for payment systems 
consist of both the start-up costs and the per-transaction costs.  
Furthermore, consumers need not adopt a new payment system for all 
transactions; a consumer can choose to obtain a credit card but still 
pay for most transactions with cash or check.  Therefore, what really 
matters to a consumer is whether there is some subset of transactions 
(i) for which Equation 5 is true: 
 
 
18 See E-ZPass – Sign Up Now!, http://www.ezpassnj.com/static/signup/ind_plans 
.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). 
19 For consumers who pay by check, they must replenish the account by sending in a 
check in a timely fashion.  For those consumers who have neither a credit card nor a 
checking account, they must make these payments either by money order or in cash at an 
E-ZPass facility. 
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   Bi(n) > Bi(f) + SC(n) + TCi(n) – TCi(f)20 (6) 
 
Unlike benefits and per-transaction costs, we do not limit start-up 
costs to those for i transactions on the theory that the start-up costs are 
the same regardless of the size of the subset of transactions.  For 
instance, the costs of obtaining a debit card are the same regardless of 
whether the consumer will use it only to get cash from an ATM or 
will use it for all of her purchases.  In addition, we ignore the start-up 
costs associated with the preexisting payment option because those 
costs are sunk.  However, as we will note below, sunk costs in some 
circumstances may play a role in decision making about payment 
systems. 
As an example, consider a consumer’s decision to obtain a new 
credit card.  As with the E-ZPass example above, there will be some 
start-up hassle costs in obtaining the card and perhaps even a small 
fee associated with the card.  The real question for the consumer, 
given these start-up costs, is whether there is a set of transactions for 
which the consumer’s additional benefits from having the card exceed 
the additional costs of having the card: 
 
   Bi(n) – TCi(n) – Bi(f) + TCi(f) > SC(n)21 (7) 
 
Assume that in the past the consumer has paid for her gasoline 
purchases using cash, but that her service station’s owner, whom we 
will call Gas Co., is offering her a credit card with which to purchase 
gasoline in the future.  We will assume that the consumer receives no 
benefit from using cash and that the costs of obtaining cash are quite 
 
20 Professors Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole hypothesize that a customer should 
purchase a payment card only if the expected benefit exceeds the expected fee.  Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of 
Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549, 553 (2002).  Our analysis here is 
similar, but with some modifications.  First, we make clear the distinction between start-up 
costs for a system and per-transaction costs, and we assume that the costs that really drive 
decision making by consumers are not financial, but rather temporal and psychic.  (Rochet 
and Tirole describe the fee as the “customer’s yearly fee,” id., and not as a per actual 
transaction fee, suggesting it is just meant to cover up-front fees.)  Second, our version 
recognizes that the benefit available to the consumer is limited to those circumstances 
where the benefits of a particular payment system are greater than those of other systems.  
In other words, the benefit that Rochet and Tirole identify can only be calculated as a net 
against the existing benefits from other payment systems. 
21 Admittedly, in theory we need to account for the lost opportunity cost on alternative 
investments of the start-up costs, as we did in Part I.A.  We do not do so here because we 
believe that such costs are generally quite low. 
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low.  Furthermore, there are no actual financial costs for using cash 
because she has ready access to her bank’s ATMs, which charge her 
no fees.  Also, the marginal hassle cost of getting cash for such 
transactions is quite low: say the discounted present value of such 
costs is $100.  Filling out the application and obtaining the card from 
Gas Co. involves no financial fee, but assume that there is a real 
hassle cost involved, and that this can be quantified as the equivalent 
of fifty dollars.  Furthermore, we will assume that Gas Co. offers her 
no benefit for using the card, although the transaction costs are 
reduced to seventy-five dollars.22  On this account, the consumer 
ought to decline the card because it results in an expected net decrease 
in her utility: SC(n) = $50, while Bi(n) – TCi(n) – Bi(f) + TCi(f) = $25. 
To remedy this problem, Gas Co. might introduce a rebate program 
that gives the consumer five percent cash back on all purchases made 
with the Gas Co. card over a calendar year.  If the discounted present 
value of that rebate is, say, fifty dollars, now the consumer should 
adopt the card because the start-up costs (fifty dollars) are outweighed 
by the net gain on the other side of Equation 7: seventy-five dollars. 
Two difficulties with consumer decisions about new technologies 
are that many of the costs are unquantifiable, such as hassle costs, and 
that consumers will tend to be quite heterogeneous in how they value 
these costs.  Return again to our Gas Co. example.  We hypothesized 
that the consumer faced lower transaction costs for a credit 
transaction than for a cash transaction.  If such costs are limited to 
hassle costs, this may strike most readers as intuitively correct 
because they usually pump their own gas and can pay with a credit 
card right at the pump, whereas cash payments may require going into 
a store and may even require prepayment.  The assumption does not 
strike us as intuitively correct, however, because we both work in 
New Jersey, where we cannot pump our own gas, and payments with 
cash are both quicker and generally friendlier (particularly in winter, 
gas station attendants do not relish trudging back and forth with credit 
cards while we sign).  A New Jersey consumer, therefore, may need a 
greater benefit to adopt the Gas Co. card than a consumer across the 
river in New York where consumers pump their own gas.  
Furthermore, the willingness of New Jersey consumers to adopt the 
card will vary with how much they disvalue the cost of paying with 
 
22 Even assuming that the consumer can be sure that she will never pay credit fees for 
running a revolving balance on the card, she still has the hassle of making monthly 
payments to Gas Co. and any financial fees involved in making such payments, such as the 
purchase of additional checks. 
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credit; some of us are simply less sensitive both to the time loss and 
the unfriendliness of the attendants.23 
Another problem is that the unquantifiable costs are, we believe, 
quite diverse.  So far we have focused on the hassle of engaging in 
any particular transaction, but there are other potential costs.  For 
instance, consumers might be concerned not just with the hassle of 
using a credit card, but with the potential loss of privacy as well.  One 
“benefit” of cash transactions is that they generally leave no record, 
whereas credit card payments can generate a paper trail of exactly 
where a consumer has spent her money.  For instance, a person who 
wants to hide certain transactions from a spouse has a powerful 
reason to pay with cash rather than credit.24 
In addition, there is a risk of both money and identity theft.  When 
a consumer adopts cash as a payment system, she obviously takes the 
risk that she will be robbed at some point and lose the cash in her 
possession.  The risk of this type of theft is lower with the adoption of 
a credit card or even a debit card system: in both cases, a consumer’s 
liability for unauthorized transactions is capped both by statute and by 
card company practice.  However, adoption of credit cards and debit 
cards may open up consumers to the possibility of identity theft, 
which can impose both financial and nonfinancial costs. 
Furthermore, there is the problem of sunk costs.  As Professor 
Richard Thaler has noted, “only incremental costs and benefits should 
affect decisions.”25  But in reality, historical costs appear to affect the 
decisions that consumers make in the future.  Consider again the 
consumer who has gone through the hassle of setting up an E-ZPass 
account and obtaining the RFID transponder.  Once the consumer has 
E-ZPass, the hassle becomes a sunk cost that the consumer ought to 
ignore (as a normative matter) in making decisions about how she 
will pay for particular tolls.26  Indeed, the consumer will inevitably 
 
23 The same observation can be made about HD television sets, where there may be 
costs in learning the new technology well enough to make the initial purchase, in setting 
up the set itself, and in obtaining HD service from a cable or dish provider.  Again, all 
consumers will value these costs differently. 
24 This remains true even in an age when cash transactions — to the extent they involve 
an ATM withdrawal —generate some form of record.  It is a lot safer to pay $1000 for 
jewelry for your mistress using cash rather than using the credit card at Tiffany’s.  
Somewhat plausible stories for the $1000 withdrawal are easier to generate than stories 
about who received the jewelry. 
25 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 39, 47 (1980). 
26 See id. 
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encounter situations where the cash alternative is superior to    E-
ZPass, such as when the driver has coins readily available and the E-
ZPass lines are longer than the others.  But because ours is a positive 
model, we assume, in accord with the experimental evidence, that 
such sunk costs do affect consumer decisions about payment systems 
such that previous costs incurred to obtain access to a payment system 
will make the consumer more likely to use the system.27  For 
instance, consumers who have paid for access to a charge card may be 
more willing to use that card in the future than they otherwise would 
be.28 
The benefits to consumers from various payment services can also 
be unquantifiable and quite diverse.  The most obvious examples of 
financial benefits to adopting a payment system are reward or affinity 
systems: either a small rebate on the purchase or a credit toward a 
reward (such as a free airline ticket).29  As for nonfinancial benefits, a 
consumer might value the payment system’s ability to generate a 
record of the transaction (the flip-side of our privacy cost point 
above).  Prestige or social standing is another potential benefit of 
some payment systems.  For instance, some people may pay with a 
“platinum” credit card instead of another credit card, not because the 
rate is cheaper or the hassle costs lower, but simply to gain the 
prestige that they believe is associated with having and using the 
card — the same being no doubt true of HD televisions.30  In other 
contexts, some consumers may wish to use a payment system to 
indicate that they are “tech-savvy.”  For instance, when the New York 
City Transit Authority introduced the Metrocard, it believed that early 
 
27 See id. 
28 There are other transaction costs that may appear to be sunk costs but are not.  For 
example, say a consumer is deciding whether to pay in cash or write a check for a 
purchase.  In order to write a check, the consumer would have first had to decide to 
purchase checks, which often costs the consumer money.  Although this prior purchase of 
checks might be seen as a sunk cost, it is not.  The consumer will correctly intuit that 
writing a check brings her closer to having to buy more checks: the price of a check is 
properly a cost of writing one.  This is actually — i n our terminology — a per-transaction 
cost for the consumer.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
29 MANN, supra note 14, at 167. 
30 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Spending in Gilded Style, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1983, at F12; 
Carole Gould, Personal Finance: In Credit Cards, All that Glitters . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
2, 1986, at F9; Jane Wolfe, Vicarious Consumption: Beyond the Glow of Platinum, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, § 3, at 10. 
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users would be just such individuals.31  Of course, consumers may 
have completely idiosyncratic reasons for liking the older payment 
form.  Think, for instance, of the forty-year-old who still eats Kraft 
Macaroni and Cheese.  We can be fairly certain that he would choose 
something else if he were tasting it for the first time, but the whole 
point is that the taste is not his first.  As with food, familiarity and 
tradition may provide much of a payment system’s appeal.  For 
example, checks have proven remarkably persistent despite the many 
electronic alternatives, particularly for payment from remote 
locations.  The most common explanation for this persistence is that 
individuals are simply wedded to tradition.32  The comfort that comes 
from maintaining the tradition weighs in any decision to maintain the 
status quo. 
Finally, because ours is a descriptive model, we focus in both this 
Part and the next on how consumers actually perceive the costs and 
benefits we are describing, not on the “real value” of these costs and 
benefits, even when they are easily quantifiable.  For example, to the 
extent that consumers fail to account for some real costs— f or 
instance, not taking into account the full costs of using a credit 
card —we accordingly discount them.33 
C.  Consumer Decisions to Use a New Technology 
This brings us to the second-stage decision: the consumer’s choice 
among new technologies for a particular transaction.  Our basic 
postulate is that a consumer will decide to use a new technology over 
an old technology where the expected utility from the new technology 
exceeds the utility that would be derived from using the old 
technology.  This can again be seen by focusing on payment systems: 
a consumer will pick payment system n (say, a credit card) over 
payment system f (say, cash) for a particular transaction j when the 
expected utility for using the credit card exceeds the expected utility 
of using cash.  To calculate the expected utility of a particular 
 
31 See Matthew L. Wald, Fare Card Plan in the Subways Exceeds Goals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 1994, § 1, at 39 (noting that it was unclear if such people had actually adopted the 
Metrocard). 
32 Sujit Chakravorti & Carrie Jankowski, Forces Shaping the Payments Environment: A 
Summary of the Chicago Fed’s 2005 Payments Conference 1–2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., 
Chi. Fed. Letter No. 219a, Oct. 2005), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cfloctober2005_219a.pdf. 
33 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395–
1408 (2004) (giving a positive account of consumer choice within the credit card market). 
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payment system, consumers weigh the benefits and per-transaction 
costs of the competing payment options.  Because the start-up costs 
for both systems are now sunk, system n should be selected over 
system f where: 
 
   Bj(n) – TCj(n) > Bj(f) – TCj(f) (8) 
 
An important conceptual difference between Equation 7 and 
Equation 8 is that, here, the consumer is selecting a new technology 
not on the anticipated benefits and costs for a hypothetical set of 
transactions, but instead for a particular transaction.  In other words, 
at this stage the consumer— g enerally— w ill have better information 
about the actual value of the costs and benefits of a particular 
payment system. 
As an example, return to a consumer’s choice to adopt the card 
from Gas Co. and now assume that our consumer lives in New York 
and works in New Jersey.  In making the decision whether to adopt 
the credit card, she faces uncertainty as to where she is going to make 
her gasoline purchases.  On the one hand, if she makes all of them in 
New York (where again she pumps her own gas), it makes sense to 
get the card because the transaction costs for credit are less than the 
transaction costs for cash.  On the other hand, if she makes all of her 
gasoline purchases in New Jersey, where we hypothesize that the 
transaction costs of credit outweigh the transaction costs of cash, she 
then should not adopt the card.  For the consumer in this situation, the 
likelihood of gasoline purchases in New York or New Jersey drives 
the decision whether to adopt the card. 
At the point of the decision to use the card, however, this 
uncertainty is obviously removed.  If she is purchasing gasoline in 
New York, it makes sense to use the card because the marginal 
benefits of using credit over cash likely outweigh the marginal 
transaction costs.34  If she is in New Jersey, however, the marginal 
costs of using the card may outweigh the benefits such that the 
consumer will not use the card.  The point is that at the time of the 
actual decision to use, the uncertainty has been removed. 
 
34 This may not always be true, even in New York.  The marginal benefits from using a 
card, if they are limited to the rebate, are likely to be constant.  The marginal transaction 
costs could, however, vary. 
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D.  Network Effects and Multi-Sided Platforms 
Up to this point, we have modeled consumer and merchant 
decisions based upon an implicit assumption that the benefits and 
costs to the parties are independent of the choices made by other 
parties.  But as we have noted above, that assumption is clearly 
wrong.  Many new technologies are subject to network effects: the 
benefits to both consumers and merchants of adopting the innovation 
turn, in large part, on the willingness of other market participants to 
adopt or use that innovation.35  Consider again Equations 2 and 7.  
The decision by a merchant to invest in a new technology (Equation 
2) depends directly upon the additional revenue to be generated by the 
system.  For there to be additional revenue, there must be consumers 
who have both adopted the new system and who will use it if the 
merchants offer it.  So if no potential customers of our hypothetical 
restaurant have adopted the credit card, nor are likely to do so, then 
the restaurant is unlikely to see any additional revenue, and it is fairly 
certain that an alternative investment would make more sense.  
Similarly, if few broadcasters are providing programming in HD, then 
the value of an HDTV is much lower than if all broadcasters are 
doing so. 
A consumer’s decision to adopt a new technology (Equation 7) is 
similarly dependent upon merchants adopting the system.  The greater 
the number of transactions in which a new system can be used, the 
more likely it is that we can identify some subset of such transactions 
for which Equation 7 will be true.  For instance, we suggested in our 
Gas Co. example that using a five percent rebate might be enough to 
get a consumer to adopt the card, depending upon the hassle costs.  
We also hypothesized a scenario in which using the card made sense 
in New York, but not in New Jersey.  However, if not all Gas Co. 
stations take the card, or she also buys gasoline at other companies’ 
stations that do not accept the card, then her benefit from using the 
card will be lower and perhaps insufficient to overcome the start-up 
costs of adopting the card.  On the other hand, if she can use the card 
not just to make gasoline purchases at Gas Co., but also food 
purchases at Fast Food Co., then her benefits from the card may be 
even greater, making the card’s adoption much more likely.  The 
 
35 Of course, the decision to use the payment system is not dependent in this way upon 
the willingness of merchants to adopt the system.  The ability to make a decision about use 
depends in the first instance upon the merchant’s decision to have adopted that payment 
system. 
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point is that merchant decisions to adopt a payment system increase 
the set of possible transactions in which the conditions of Equation 7 
for consumer adoption will be met. 
Not only are new technologies subject to network effects, but they 
are also often multi-sided platforms.  David Evans and Richard 
Schmalensee define such markets as having three basic 
characteristics: (1) there are at least two distinct types of customers 
for the product; (2) there is some benefit to be obtained from 
coordinating members of the groups; and (3) there is an intermediary 
that, through coordination, can make the members of the groups better 
off.36  Examples of such multi-sided platform networks include 
operating systems (which make both software developers and 
computer users better off), television manufacturers (which make 
both broadcasters and viewers better off), and payment systems 
(which have the potential to make both consumers and merchants 
better off).37  Because they are multi-sided platforms, the benefits to a 
party of the network do not depend upon the number of similar parties 
that are on the network, but instead upon the number of parties there 
are on the other side of the platform.  For instance, a video game user 
traditionally did not care about how many other players use a 
particular gaming system; what she really cared about was how many 
video games were developed for the system.38  Of course, sometimes 
the existence of other users on the same side of the platform will be 
an additional benefit to a network, but the key to any such network is 
having enough users on both sides of the platform.  For instance, if 
your colleagues are watching your favorite television show, water 
cooler talk might enhance your enjoyment of it.  But regardless of 
how much viewers enjoy a show, it will be cancelled unless sufficient 
numbers of advertisers are interested in the program.39 
 
36 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 134–35. 
37 See id. at 136–38. 
38 This may be less true now as more gaming systems have remote multi-player games. 
39 As a recent example, consider the demise of the CBS show Joan of Arcadia.  While 
the show was plagued by declining ratings, the real factor leading to cancellation in 2005 
seems to have been the age of its average viewer: 53.9.  See Tony Esparza, Fans Demand 
‘Joan’, Fight CBS over Cancellation, USA TODAY, May 30, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/2005-05-30-joan-arcadia       -fans-petition_x.htm.  That 
average age number made the show very unattractive to advertisers, who prefer younger 
viewers. 
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A multi-sided platform network presents the chicken-or-the-egg 
problem:40 unless both sides of the transaction can be convinced that 
they are better off with the new system, it will not be adopted.  
Furthermore, the presence of network effects means that a consumer’s 
willingness to adopt the new technology will depend on merchants 
also adopting it.  The result, as commentators have noted in the 
context of payments, is that “[t]o gain critical mass in the 
marketplace, payment providers have to convince simultaneously a 
large number of participants of the benefits of new payment 
mechanisms.”41  Thus, the consumers and merchants whose behavior 
we model above are not isolated from each other; rather, a merchant 
considering whether to adopt a new technology considers whether 
consumers are likely to adopt the same technology, and vice versa.42 
E.  The Difficulty of Achieving a Critical Mass 
The rub, however, is that groups on the opposite side of a platform 
are unlikely to be easily convinced that they have the same interest in 
adopting (and using) a new technology.  As Equations 2 and 7 
illustrate, the conditions under which consumers and merchants are 
likely to adopt a technology are often different.  In the context of 
payment systems, we predict that a merchant will adopt a payment 
system whenever the additional revenues gained from the system’s 
adoption outweigh the additional revenues that could be generated 
from another investment of those resources.  For their part, consumers 
will adopt a new payment system only where the start-up costs for 
adopting the system are outweighed by the increase in net benefits 
and costs from moving to the new system for some set of transactions. 
Not every new payment system, however, will satisfy both 
Equations 2 and 7.  As an example, consider the introduction of stored 
value cards on the Upper West Side of New York City in the 1990s.  
The cards, which were rolled out by four leading financial 
institutions, failed spectacularly because only merchants, and not 
 
40 This exists whenever payors and payees must adopt a new technology simultaneously 
for it to be successful.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also EVANS & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at xiii. 
41 Chakravorti & Jankowski, supra note 32, at 2. 
42 A recent example of this is the battle over the format for high-definition DVD 
players.  The recent success of the Blu-ray format in obtaining the support of most movie 
studios of course makes the alternative HD DVD technology worthless to consumers.  See 
Josh Levin, I’m the Idiot Who Bought an HD-DVD Player, SLATE, Feb. 28, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2185365. 
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consumers, adopted them.43  In other words, Equation 2 for merchants 
appears to have been satisfied, but not Equation 7 for consumers.  
Merchants appear to have had quite limited start-up costs, which 
suggests that the additional revenues from the cards need not have 
been great for merchants to be willing to offer them.  Furthermore, to 
the extent some consumers converted from cash to using the stored 
value cards, merchants presumably would have seen additional 
revenues in the form of a reduced risk of theft of the funds by robbers 
or employees. 
Consumers, however, did not have adequate reason to adopt the 
card.  The stored value cards were distributed as microchip-based 
smart cards placed onto debit cards, which were then sent to 
customers who lived on the Upper West Side.44  In the payments 
universe existing at the time, stored value cards competed with cash 
and, to a lesser degree, debit cards.45  From the consumer’s 
perspective, it is hard to see any set of transactions in which the stored 
value card was better than either cash or a debit card.  Consumers had 
to load the stored value card at an ATM, so the card had just as much 
hassle cost as getting cash and no other lowered costs or added 
benefits.  Indeed, the cards were not safer than cash because, 
assuming a consumer was robbed of her cash, her cards were likely to 
be taken as well, and the stored value would be lost.46  Stored value 
cards also did not improve the consumer’s position as compared to 
debit cards because both could be used for the same kind of 
transaction, and most merchants who were wired to accept stored 
 
43 See Lisa W. Foderaro, A Test in Cashless Spending Turns Out to Be a Hard Sell, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1998, at B4 (quoting a merchant who commented, “It’s a dud.  I have 
maybe three steady customers who use it, and they’re in the Hamptons now.”). 
44 See id. 
45 The experiment was initiated in 1997.  At the time, debit cards were a fast-growing 
subset of payments, but still a fraction of what they are today.  See Fumiko Hayashi et al., 
A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry 41–43 (Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City, 
2003), http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/PSR/ BksJournArticles/ATMPaper.pdf. 
46 Professor Leo van Hove suggests that stored value cards may be better for consumers 
than cash because transaction time is similar and consumers do not have to worry about 
exact change, do not have to carry a bulky wallet or purse containing bills and coins, and 
may be able to reload the device at home, which removes the need to reload by phone.  
Leo van Hove, Electronic Purses in Euroland: Why Do Penetration and Usage Rates 
Differ? 11–12 (SUERF, Working Paper, on file with author).  All but the last of these 
benefits applied to the New York trial.  Professor van Hove’s analysis—which was not 
aimed at the New York trial — ignores that, at least for an initial adopter, some of these 
benefits did not exist because not all merchants accepted the cards.  Furthermore, to the 
extent cash had been downloaded to the card, it then became unavailable to use at cash-
only merchants. 
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value cards would presumably also accept debit cards.  In addition, 
debit cards, which required the use of a PIN, had additional security.  
The “cash back” feature of debit cards also allowed greater access to 
funds.  In sum, no set of transactions existed for which consumers 
would prefer stored value cards.  Thus, even if the start-up costs 
associated with the cards were quite low, consumers simply had no 
incentives to adopt them. 
Despite the absence of benefits to one side of the transaction, a new 
technology can still thrive if the provider can internalize some of one 
party’s gains and the other party’s costs, and thereby make the 
system’s adoption more likely.  One way to do this is for the platform 
provider to give a benefit to one side of the platform to stimulate 
adoption.  For instance, in our Gas Co. example we imagined the 
consumer being given a five percent rebate as a way of encouraging 
adoption.  Similar examples exist in the real world.  For instance, 
while general use stored value cards have not succeeded in the 
market, proprietary stored value cards have had more success.  In 
such transactions, the merchant and the platform are the same entity 
(as they are in our Gas Co. example), and therefore the 
merchant/platform can internalize the costs to the consumers by 
directly offering other benefits to the consumer to entice use of the 
card.  For instance, Starbucks has heavily promoted its Starbucks 
Card, which is a stored value card that consumers can use to make 
store purchases.  Between October and the end of December 2005, 
consumers placed more than thirty-five percent more value on 
Starbucks Cards than they had a year earlier.47  At first glance, such 
increased usage is perplexing, given that consumers can use cash or 
offline debit cards at most Starbucks locations.  However, a large 
portion of the loaded value in the quarter represented money placed 
on gift cards, and almost seventy-five percent of the value placed on 
the cards occurred during just one of the three months during the 
quarter: December.48  The question, of course, was whether 
individuals who received the gift cards would reload them with their 
own funds.  To this end, Starbucks undertook an initiative to get 
consumers to use the Starbucks Card by tying the Starbucks card to a 
credit card, the “Duetto” card.  At the end of each month, the 
consumer automatically received a reward in the amount of one 
 
47 See Press Release, Starbucks Corp., Starbucks Announces Record First Quarter Fiscal 
2006 Results (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.starbucks.com/ 
aboutus/pressdesc.asp?id=640. 
48 Id. 
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percent of the purchases made on the Duetto credit card over that 
month. 
Another complication for initiating a new technology is the fact we 
noted in Part I.B: the benefits from using the technology are quite 
varied and they include potentially substantial nonfinancial benefits to 
a particular system.  Furthermore, some of these benefits may tend to 
lock a consumer into an existing technology in a way that does not 
lock in merchants.  Continuing with the Starbucks example, some 
consumers may tend to keep using a store-branded stored value card 
out of loyalty: being seen by others as a regular Starbucks consumer 
may bring them some value.  For many other consumers, though, 
there will be no such value, and this consideration will play no role in 
their decision to use —or more likely not use — the card. 
This heterogeneity in the value of technologies to consumers is a 
problem when it comes to gaining a particular innovation’s 
widespread acceptance.  Many of the benefits offered to entice one set 
of consumers will have no value to most other users.  As a result, 
even if the providers of new technologies succeed in attracting a small 
number of consumers, they will not obtain a critical mass. 
The history of charge and credit cards provides an example of this 
phenomenon.49  Charge cards, particularly the American Express 
card, experienced substantial growth through the 1950s, ’60s, and 
’70s.  The overall penetration of charge cards nonetheless remained 
quite low by our present standards: by 1977, American Express—
which was by this time the dominant pure charge card —had merely 
eight million cardholders.50  Indeed, the peak penetration of charge 
cards into American households between 1970 and 2001 occurred in 
1989, when thirteen percent of Americans had such cards.51  The 
difficulty for charge cards was, and is, that their benefits as a payment 
system are limited.52 
 
49 The term charge card means any card that permits the cardholder to make a payment 
using the card, with the amount charged to a third party who then collects the funds from 
the cardholder.  They are different from credit cards, in which the third party permits the 
cardholder to defer payment of the funds and instead allows the cardholder to finance the 
charge through a revolving line of credit. 
50 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 67. 
51 Id. at 89. 
52 Of course, we are not trying to suggest here that charge cards have been a failure.  
Charge cards continue to be an important part of the electronic payments universe.  Our 
point is simply that, compared to credit cards and debit cards, charge cards have been 
relatively unsuccessful.  This lack of success is particularly noteworthy given that charge 
cards existed before credit cards. 
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Credit cards, by comparison, have experienced far greater market 
penetration.  In 1970, the percentage of American households holding 
a credit card was only sixteen percent— r oughly the same percentage 
at which charge cards reached their peak.53  By 2001, the market 
penetration of credit cards had exploded to almost seventy-three 
percent.54  Credit cards have done so much better than charge cards 
over the last thirty-five years because they offer a wider range of 
benefits to consumers, leading to wider acceptance of the cards by 
merchants, leading in turn to even greater use by consumers. 
What differences between charge cards and credit cards led to 
these wildly divergent outcomes?  The most important is the ability of 
credit cards to extend a revolving line of credit to consumers.  This is, 
in itself, a benefit that may often lead consumers to use a credit card 
over other options.  Furthermore, changes in both technology and the 
law made it easier to offer revolving credit to consumers in the 1970s 
and ’80s.  With the development of computer technology and 
information processing, credit card issuers were better able to identify 
consumers who would be both interested in adopting a card and 
profitable for the credit provider.  Furthermore, after the Supreme 
Court decided that local usury laws would generally not restrict the 
interest rates charged by credit card companies,55 credit providers 
were able to profit by lending to consumers who had previously been 
deemed too risky.56  The increased profits available from these lines 
of credit allowed credit card issuers to draw in still more consumers 
through reward and affinity programs.  The net result was a wide 
range of benefits that enabled credit cards to vastly increase their 
market share.57 
 
53 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 89. 
54 Id. 
55 Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 
313–14 (1978). 
56 The actual holding in Marquette National Bank was that a “national bank” was only 
restricted by the usury laws of the state in which it was located, not by the laws of the state 
in which its customer was located.  Id. at 313–14.  The practical effect of the decision, 
though, was that most large banks established legal residence in jurisdictions such as 
South Dakota and Delaware where there were no caps on interest rates.  See EVANS & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 69–70. 
57 The same basic logic applies to merchants, of course.  But because we assume that 
merchants, as a whole, are more driven by pure financial concerns in picking payments 
systems than consumers, we assume that they are less heterogeneous than consumers.  
However, there are certainly circumstances in which the benefits of a particular payment 
system are insufficiently attractive to particular merchants that at least one subset of 
merchants refuses to adopt the new payment system. 
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The importance of satisfying the heterogeneous interests of 
potential users raises a broader point about efficiency.  An emerging 
technology will often hold the promise of net financial gains for users 
on both sides of the platform.  But if the innovator does not find a 
means of satisfying or overriding the disparate interests of potential 
users, the system will not be widely adopted.  For example, because 
emerging payment forms often have lower service costs than their 
preexisting competitors, improvements in payment systems can create 
clear economic benefits.  But the market, left to itself, will not always 
adopt the most efficient system.  That is, the technology with the 
lower service cost may not be able to obtain a  critical mass of users 
without government intervention.  The next Part describes the 




When it comes to influencing consumers’ technology use, the 
government can play three separate — and, in some cases, 
overlapping— r oles.  “Legislator” is the most familiar role; that is, 
government enacts laws or regulations that make the social 
acceptance of a particular technology more likely.  When the 
government acts purely in its law-making role, it has no direct stake 
in whether the technology thrives.  Instead, the government believes 
that society at large will benefit from the technology, primarily 
because of efficiency gains.  For example, the U.S. government has 
long been interested in ensuring that adequate public airwaves are 
available for wireless telecommunications services.  As we discuss 
below,58 it has taken regulatory measures to ensure this result.  The 
government has taken these actions not because it has a direct 
financial interest in companies selling wireless services, but rather 
because of the productivity gains that result from such services.  
Productivity gains benefit the economy, so the government has reason 
to legislate in ways that promote such gains. 
In discrete areas of the economy —most notably transportation and 
postal service — the government functions like a seller.  Here the 
government either acts as the sole provider of a service whose 
practical requirements make it unattractive to private industry (like 
 
58 See infra notes 115–24 and accompanying text. 
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highway systems or large-scale public transportation), or the 
government competes with private companies that offer some 
overlapping services (as with the Postal Service and Federal Express).  
When the government acts as a seller, it has a direct interest in 
whether its customers adopt particular technologies, as failure will 
adversely affect the government’s bottom line. 
Finally, the government can act as a fiduciary or guardian of the 
public interest.  For example, the now-familiar technologies of 
movies, television, and radio raised concerns about the suitability of 
some content for young or sensitive audiences.  The government has 
acted to protect these interests in a variety of ways, such as adopting 
standards that limit the hours during which indecent or profane 
programming can appear59 and pressuring the entertainment industry 
to adopt rating systems. 
Payments are particularly useful for elucidating the various roles 
that government plays because payments are an area in which the 
government acts as fiduciary, seller, and lawmaker.  Government is 
probably most visible in its fiduciary role where it has two closely 
related goals: (1) to ensure that payees will accept coins and currency, 
and (2) to increase the demand for coins and currency by encouraging 
consumers to use new currency forms.  These goals are intimately 
connected because if payees refuse particular coins and currency, then 
payors are unlikely to use them.  For instance, the Treasury 
Department introduced new colors on the twenty-dollar bill in 2003, 
the fifty-dollar bill in 2004, and on the ten-dollar bill in 2006.  
Between 1996 and 2000, the Treasury introduced updated versions of 
the $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100 bills.60  In support of many of these 
changes, the Treasury Department undertook substantial advertising 
campaigns to ensure both payee acceptance and payor use of the new 
bills.  Less successfully, the Treasury Department has also attempted 
to gain support for dollar coins on several occasions.61 
While “fiduciary” is the government’s most well-known role with 
regard to payments, it is increasingly common for government to act 
 
59 For the full scope of the Federal Communications Commission’s content regulations, 
see Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Obscene, Indecent, and Profane Broadcasts, 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). 
60 History of U.S. Currency — U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 
http://www.moneyfactory.gov/newmoney/main.cfm/currency/history (last visited Jan. 11, 
2009). 
61 John P. Caskey & Simon St. Laurent, The Susan B. Anthony Dollar and the Theory of 
Coin/Note Substitutions, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 495 passim (1994). 
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as “seller” by designing a payment system for a service it purveys.  
Governmental agencies have long created payment systems for 
collecting fares connected with both public and private transportation.  
In particular, they have encouraged and in some cases even required 
using tokens to pay fares on toll roads, buses, and trains.62  In the 
electronic age, governmental agencies have strongly pressured riders 
and drivers to cease paying fares and tolls in cash and instead to adopt 
new, electronic forms of payment.  For instance, drivers all along the 
East Coast have been encouraged to adopt E-ZPass by the liberal use 
of toll discounts.63  Similarly, when the New York City 
Transportation Authority first introduced Metrocards, discounts were 
considered essential to obtaining consumer acceptance of the cards.64 
Finally, the government acts as lawmaker with respect to various 
payment forms.  As noted in the introduction, complex legislation and 
regulation underlie the American checking system.  In recent years, 
Congress has adopted legislation to make it easier for banks to 
exchange electronic copies of checks instead of physical hard 
copies.65  Of course, the government has only a small financial 
interest in the existence of a robust check collection system, and 
therefore little direct interest in whether substitute checks succeed or 
fail.66  When the government acts as seller, it has a much larger 
financial stake in the success of enterprises such as Metrocard and E-
ZPass.  The government’s interest in the checking system also is 
qualitatively different than when it acts as fiduciary: the acceptance of 
 
62 See, e.g., Nemser v. New York City Trans. Auth., 530 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494–95 (1988) 
(noting and upholding the NYCTA’s requirement that fares be paid using tokens). 
63 See Joe Malinconico, Turnpike Targeting E-ZPass Discount, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Nov. 11, 2004, at 19 (noting discounts given in New York and New 
Jersey); Joe Malinconico, Will It Be E-ZCome, E-ZGo?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
Nov. 29, 2004, at 13.  Similar tactics have been used in Illinois to get drivers there to adopt 
the similar I-Pass.  See Gene Amromin et al., Inducing More Efficient Payment on the 
Illinois Tollway (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Chi. Fed. Letter No. 225, Apr. 2006), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/ cflapril2006_225.pdf. 
64 Douglas Martin, Fare Cards: A Glimpse of the Future Underground, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 7, 1994, at B3; James C. McKinley Jr., Despite Big Push, New Yorkers Snub Transit 
Card, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at A1; Richard Perez-Pena, Transit Agency Plans Its 
First Volume Discounts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1996, § 1, at 1. 
65 12 U.S.C. § 5003 (2008). 
66 Indeed, the Federal Reserve generally attempts to set its check collection fees so as to 
cover the associated costs.  See Appendix 2 to testimony of Vice Chair Alice M. Rivlin 
Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/testimony/1997/ 970916a2.htm (last visited Jan. 
11, 2009). 
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substitute checks is not vital to the continued functioning of the 
economy in the way that the acceptance of United States currency is. 
But the government does have a general interest in payment 
systems.  As we noted in Part I, some payment systems are more 
efficient than others.  Efficiency is generally good for society, so the 
government has reason to promote it.  The government might also 
have an interest in being responsive to the subjective preferences of 
consumers and merchants, even when these preferences are in tension 
with efficiency.  After all, efficiency is not —nor should it be— t he 
only criterion by which to judge governmental action.  In the next 
Part, we assume that the government has a legitimate interest in 
changing endogenous preferences about technology in pursuit of 
efficiency and perhaps other goals.  We thus proceed to examine and 
evaluate the tools government has at its disposal. 
III 
AFFECTING PREFERENCES AND NETWORK EFFECTS 
Whether and how the government affects our technology 
preferences depends on the government’s precise goal, the role it has 
assumed, and the particular sort of technology at issue.  Depending on 
the situation, the government may (a) provide information that allows 
individuals to coordinate their behavior, (b) pass legislation or adopt 
policies aimed at reducing or eliminating concerns about a particular 
technology, (c) provide incentives to induce individuals to adopt a 
new technology, or (d) force change by eliminating or curtailing the 
older technology.  The next section examines these options, each of 
which represents an incremental increase in the amount of pressure 
placed on potential users of the new technology.67 
A.  Focal Points and Information 
As our earlier discussion of network effects suggested, most 
technology requires coordination.  For instance, a business cannot 
send a fax unless the intended recipient also has a fax machine, and a 
man will not have any luck using e-Harmony to find his future spouse 
unless women are also using the service.  Payment systems require 
this sort of coordination: in order for a consumer transaction to occur, 
the seller needs to accept the payment form that the buyer tenders.  
 
67 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995). 
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The most innocuous means of facilitating coordination is for the 
government simply to provide information about different payment 
forms.  For example, Check 21 — the federal legislation that enables 
banks to return electronic copies of checks to their customers instead 
of physical hard copies— r equires that electronic checks bear the 
legend, “This is a legal copy of your check.  You can use it the same 
way you would use the regular check.”68  This sort of government 
action helps ensure that the public recognizes electronic copies of 
checks and makes it easier for banks and those who use and receive 
checks to coordinate their behavior. 
The ability to coordinate, however, by no means guarantees that a 
person will choose to use a particular technology.  With payments, for 
example, government informational efforts should ensure that a seller 
accepts particular methods, at least when doing so requires no 
additional seller investment.  As a very simple example, a buyer may 
offer an updated twenty-dollar bill when purchasing groceries.  If the 
seller does not know that the bill is legitimate and the buyer does not 
have any alternative means of payment, the coordination failure could 
result in a lost sale.  But if the government has informed the seller 
through advertising the bill’s legitimacy, she is likely to accept it.  
Similarly, a seller who demands proof of payment is likely to accept a 
substitute check, provided she knows it is the legal equivalent of a 
traditional cancelled check.  At the very least, then, government-
supplied information helps ensure that individuals will accept one 
form of payment when they really prefer another. 
As previously suggested, however, the success of a new payment 
form — or most technologies —depends on overcoming the chicken-
or-the-egg problem.  For payments, this means that not only do 
consumers have to be willing to adopt the new form, but merchants 
must be willing to accept it, which in turn depends on merchants 
anticipating that a sufficient number of users will be on the opposite 
side of the platform.  Government-provided information may 
influence use when it emphasizes the benefits of one payment form 
over another.  For instance, when the U.S. Mint launched the 
Sacagawea one-dollar coin, it purchased a commercial that featured a 
vending machine repeatedly rejecting a frustrated individual’s one-
dollar bill.69  The Mint ultimately decided against the segment,70 but 
 
68 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b)(2) (2008). 
69 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEW DOLLAR COIN: MARKETING CAMPAIGN 
RAISED PUBLIC AWARENESS BUT NOT WIDESPREAD USE 11 (2002) [hereinafter 
MARKETING CAMPAIGN]. 
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we can easily imagine how the commercial demonstrating the coin’s 
consumer advantages would encourage use.  Consumers would be 
initially attracted to the coin, vendors would anticipate this attraction, 
and consumers would similarly anticipate that vending machines 
would accept the coin.  In other words, informational campaigns 
suggesting that one payment form is superior to another might 
influence network effects by both affecting the willingness of people 
to consider using the payment form in the first instance and by 
influencing the predictions people make about the behavior of 
individuals on the other side of the platform. 
Particularly when government is acting as fiduciary and seller, 
however, it may want to do more than just ensure use and acceptance 
of a technology.  Instead, it might desire that a particular technology 
dominates.  The government introduces the dollar coin, the 
Metrocard, or some other payment method because it sees an 
opportunity to increase efficiency and correspondingly reduce costs.  
As such, the government may try to make a particular technology the 
focal point around which individuals will voluntarily coordinate their 
behavior.71 
As used in the economics literature, “focal point” refers to the 
place where individuals who need to coordinate their behavior 
gravitate.  In Thomas Schelling’s famed example, for instance, two 
parachutists who are unexpectedly separated must find each other.  
Schelling illustrates how one point on their maps may be focal, or the 
place where each would expect the other to go in order to meet up.72  
Richard McAdams uses Robert Sugden’s Crossroads game to 
illustrate how government speech can create focal points.73  In the 
Crossroads game, two cars approach an intersection on different 
roads.  Both drivers prefer to maintain their respective speeds and 
have the other driver yield.  Each driver’s paramount interest, 
however, is in avoiding the collision that would occur if they both 
maintained speed.  McAdams discusses how the state can erect signs 
that, independent of any legal sanction, act as focal points that allow 
drivers to coordinate whether to yield or continue forward.74  Note 
 
70 Id. at 11–12.  The Treasury had an informal restriction against comparing the dollar 
coin to the dollar bill or otherwise negatively comparing the two forms of payment.  Id. 
71 See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000). 
72 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55 (1970). 
73 McAdams, supra note 71, at 1704–05. 
74 Id. at 1706. 
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that in both the parachutist and Crossroads examples, what is 
dominant or focal may not reflect an individual’s personal preference.  
That is, the parachutist who is many miles away from the focal bridge 
may prefer to meet elsewhere, just as the driver whom the sign 
instructs to yield would prefer to continue forward.  In each example, 
however, the individual subverts his own subjective preference 
because the need to coordinate is paramount. 
Government-provided information most likely creates a focal point 
when the government acts as either fiduciary or seller.  Richard 
McAdams has posited that the law influences behavior because it 
creates expectations about how others will behave, and that people 
then coordinate their behavior around these expectations.75  
McAdams argues that the law is particularly effective at creating focal 
points because (a) new laws often receive publicity, which helps 
create expectations; (b) legal expression is unique, and thus stands out 
from competing expressions; and (c) legal officials have a reputation 
for correctly predicting future behavior.76  All of these factors make 
the legal message louder, and thus more focal, than alternative 
messages.  While McAdams is careful to note that loudness does not 
depend on the morality that is often associated with the law, he 
concedes that the legitimacy of the law matters because it further 
helps distinguish the legal message from the rest.77  Similarly, when 
the government is wearing the hat of fiduciary or seller, the public is 
likely to perceive its message as having particular legitimacy. 
Again, take payments as an example.  The U.S. government is 
universally perceived as the fiduciary of the national monetary 
system.  As such, its words have special import when the message is 
about payment methods.  While this is most obviously true when the 
message concerns U.S. coins and currency, the authority spills over to 
matters that are not directly connected to what constitutes legal 
tender.  Moreover, the message should be highly salient when the 
government is selling a service like transportation; the message, after 
all, informs the buyer which sort of payment the seller prefers. 
The Crossroads and parachutist examples, however, should 
illustrate the difficulty of convincing individuals to coordinate around 
 
75 Id. at 1651. 
76 Id. at 1666–71.  As McAdams points out, this reputation is a byproduct of the 
publicity and uniqueness of the legal message.  These two factors make the law an 
effective focal point.  Legal officials may appear to simply be predicting future behavior, 
when in fact the law they promulgate actually shapes behavior.  Id. at 1672. 
77 Id. at 1670. 
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a payment form or any sort of technology that runs counter to their 
own preferences.  Both examples offer only one opportunity to 
coordinate, which stands in stark contrast to the realities of many 
technologies.  That is, the parachutists’ maps may show many 
possible meeting spots, but unless each parachutist independently 
decides to go to the same place, they will not survive.  Similarly, one 
driver has to yield and the other has to go, or else the cars will crash 
or indefinitely stall. 
Many technologies, however, operate in areas that present myriad 
alternatives for coordination.  For instance, most sellers will accept 
more than one form of payment; if a seller does accept only one form, 
it usually will be currency and coins, which everyone uses to some 
extent.  Individuals can exchange a contract via fax, e-mail, or the 
U.S. postal system.  People can meet a prospective spouse online, at a 
bar, or at church.  Increasingly, television shows can be viewed on 
standard television sets, HDTVs, and computer screens.  
Government-supplied information may influence expectations about 
how many users will be on the opposite side of the platform, and 
therefore may affect the willingness of parties on both side of the 
platform to adopt a particular technology.  To illustrate, in Equations 
2 and 7, merchants and consumers are attempting to make predictions 
about the likelihood of increased utility from adopting the new 
system, and information supplied by the government about use by 
parties on the other side of the transaction can naturally alter these 
calculations.  But information alone is unlikely to lead to increased 
use.78  When the customer chooses among the technologies she has 
already adopted, she knows which of her options the other side has 
adopted.  Coordination thus is beside the point.  The question, then, is 
what else the government can do to influence decisions to use a 
particular technology. 
B.  Gently Addressing Particular Concerns 
Sometimes refusing to use a new technology may result from a 
particular concern about one or more aspects of the new method.  For 
example, as credit cards became increasingly popular in the 1960s, 
the possibility of theft and unauthorized charges received similar 
 
78 We acknowledge that focal-point information may generate increased use through the 
mechanism of sunk costs: if the information provided led to the consumer adopting the 
payment system, those costs may become sunk costs that then lead the consumer to use the 
system more.  See supra text accompanying notes 25–28.  Otherwise, information about 
coordination should have no effect on decisions to use a system. 
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attention that identity theft receives today.79  Congress responded to 
this concern in 1970, when it amended the Truth in Lending Act to 
provide that credit card holders are responsible for no more than fifty 
dollars of fraudulent charges.80  At about the same time, Congress 
established specific criminal penalties for fraudulent credit card use.81  
As another example, in 1978, Congress noted that while “the use of 
electronic systems to transfer funds provides the potential for 
substantial benefits to consumers,” it was nonetheless problematic 
that the “rights and liabilities of consumers” were undefined.82  Thus, 
as part of its Electronic Funds Transfer Act, the federal government 
limited an account holder’s liability for unauthorized electronic fund 
transfers to fifty dollars.83 
In all of these examples, the government spoke to consumers in its 
legislative role.  These statutes simultaneously reassure consumers 
and endorse the controversial technology.  The statutes limiting 
liability directly address a source of consumer reticence by ensuring 
that the financial institution, not the consumer, bears the risk of fraud.  
The statutes thus actively and visibly eliminated one barrier to 
widespread use, thereby underscoring governmental support for the 
new payment system.  As for the statute imposing criminal liability, it 
also sent the message to consumers that the government took credit 
card theft seriously and was taking steps to prevent it.  Some 
consumers may have believed that a criminal statute in place 
specifically addressing credit card fraud ensured fewer individuals 
would engage in fraud in the first instance.  Collectively, these 
statutes illustrate an approach in which the government behaves more 
proactively than when it simply provides information and attempts to 
create focal points around which individuals can coordinate. 
In addition to addressing particular concerns about fraud, the 
statutes influence network effects, albeit gently.  Because these 
statutes remove a barrier to use, they make both consumers and 
merchants more confident that a particular technology will become 
widespread.  With this increasing confidence, more consumers, 
merchants, and institutions will invest in the new technology.  Thus, 
 
79 See, e.g., He Who Steals My Purse Steals My Credit Cards, TIME, June 19, 1964, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,871192,00.html. 
80 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2008). 
81 Id. § 1644. 
82 Id. § 1693(a). 
83 Id. § 1693g. 
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their actions will have a feedback effect: as others become aware of 
this investment, they too will adopt the new technology, and so forth. 
C.  Providing Incentives or, Alternatively, Imposing Sanctions 
Sometimes, however, no particularized concern animates an 
individual’s decision to eschew a new technology.  Instead, the 
reticence is purely the result of the —perhaps irrational —preferences 
of individuals.  When preferences are particularly strong, effective 
government action must make the new technology’s benefits either 
larger or more tangible, or, alternatively, must make the nonuser 
internalize the cost that her preference imposes on third parties.  In 
other words, effective governmental action must incentivize use of the 
new technology, or —depending on one’s perspective — sanction use 
of the old technology. 
Such incentives can be quite effective.  For example, Metrocard 
did not become popular with New York City subway riders until the 
transit authority offered free bus transfers to Metrocard users.84  
Likewise, discounted tolls often contribute to a highway driver’s 
decision to use electronic payment.  As another example, the federal 
government— w hich stands to gain millions by auctioning off public 
airwaves after television viewers switch from analog to digital 
technology85— h as started to offer forty-dollar vouchers that can be 
used toward the purchase of digital converter boxes.86  Indirect 
incentives may be effective as well.  For instance, highway authorities 
can increase the number of lanes dedicated to electronic payment and 
decrease the number dedicated to traditional payment.  After such 
tinkering, nonelectronic users will experience the “cost” of even 
longer lines.  Indeed, some highway authorities have gone so far as to 
reserve certain freeway entrances for electronic payers.  Each of these 
incentives, whether direct or indirect, magnifies the costs of sticking 
with the old payment method. 
In each of these examples, the government acts as seller.  This is 
unsurprising because incentives are often expensive, at least in the 
short-term.  When the government acts as seller, it may have good 
reason to internalize the costs of incentives because the long-term 
 
84 Andy Newman, Hop On, Hop Off: The Unlimited Metrocard Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 3, 1998, at B1. 
85 See infra notes 115–24 and accompanying text. 
86 See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The Digital TV Transition: FAQ’s —Customer 
Corner, http://www.dtv.gov/consumercorner.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
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benefits from a switch in technology will outweigh the short-term 
costs.  The problem is that it is not always possible to find a party to 
internalize the network externalities of the new system because the 
availability of profit opportunities may be limited.  This is particularly 
true when the government acts as fiduciary. 
The story of the Susan B. Anthony dollar coin illustrates this 
difficulty.  John Caskey and Simon St. Laurent have argued that the 
coin failed because the government did not understand the importance 
of network effects or the economic theory underlying coin/note 
substitutions.87  When the government launched the Susan B. 
Anthony in 1979, it was confident that the public would accept the 
coin and predicted widespread circulation within three to four years.  
The coin, however, was a colossal flop: 
Despite the Mint’s emphasis on designing a coin suitable for 
vending machines, most machines were not recalibrated to accept it.  
Vendors had begun updating their machines before the law passed, 
but only 250,000 of four million [vending] machines accepted the 
coin by July 1979.  The cost for updating old coin acceptors ranged 
from $25 to $350 per acceptor.  Given these costs and doubts about 
the coin’s success, most vendors preferred to wait to see if the coin 
would become widely used before converting their machines. 
 The media, the public, and retailers criticized the coin for 
looking like a quarter, making it hard to distinguish rapidly.88   . . .  
Consumers and retailers complained of the coin’s similarities to the 
quarter in size, color, reeded edge, and thickness.  Because many 
customers did not want the coin, cashiers rarely offered it as 
change. . . .  Consumers declined to accept the coin from retailers as 
change, merchants returned the coins to the banks, and the banks, 
unable to redistribute them to merchants and facing high storage 
costs, sent them back to the Federal Reserve and did not order 
resupplies. 
 . . . . 
 By January 1980, only 291 million of the 750 million dollar 
coins produced were in circulation.  In March 1980, the Mint 
stopped production as a “temporary measure.”89 
The obvious problem with the Susan B. Anthony coin was network 
externalities.  Merchants deciding whether to accept the Susan B. 
 
87 John P. Caskey & Simon St. Laurent, The Susan B. Anthony Dollar and the Theory of 
Coin/Note Substitutions, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 495 (1994). 
88 This was a questionable criticism at best.  The Susan B. Anthony “weighs 43 percent 
more than the quarter, has almost the same size relation to the quarter that the quarter has 
to the nickel, and has distinctly different engraving than the quarter.”  Id. at 501. 
89 Id. at 501 (citations omitted). 
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Anthony were aware of the accompanying costs, which included 
retooling vending machines or creating space in the cash register 
drawers and the risk that employees would confuse the coin with a 
quarter.  From the merchant’s perspective, accepting the coin made 
sense only if a large number of consumers would be presenting the 
Susan B. Anthony and if the merchant would likely lose sales if she 
did not accept the coin. 
As we have discussed previously, however, consumers had an 
incentive to adopt the coin only if a sufficiently large number of 
transactions existed where the coin’s benefits overcame the costs 
imposed by adopting the coin.90  In this particular context, such 
situations were limited.  The main benefit of the coin was that it 
weighed less than the equivalent amount of quarters and would 
facilitate purchases in vending machines under then-existing 
technology.  The costs came in two forms: first, the hassle of learning 
to identify the Susan B. Anthony as readily as other coins, and 
second, having to forgo transactions with vending machines or other 
merchants that did not yet accept the coin.  Because few vending 
machines initially accepted the coins, the costs generally outweighed 
the benefits.91  The resulting equilibrium was such that neither 
merchants nor consumers had an incentive to begin using the coin, 
and, unsurprisingly, the Susan B. Anthony dollar was a flop. 
In contrast to the Susan B. Anthony, credit cards managed to 
overcome a similar initial challenge.  As S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen 
Margolis have noted more generally as to network externalities, the 
failure to adopt a new, superior standard represents “a profit 
opportunity for someone who can figure out a means of internalizing 
the [network] externality and appropriating some of the value made 
available from changing to the superior standard.”92  In other words, 
 
90 See supra text accompanying notes 18–33. 
91 Of course, this is a generalization and does not speak to all consumers or vendors.  It 
is plausible that for some consumers, the coin’s benefits outweighed its costs.  This could 
be either because (a) they disproportionately had access to machines and merchants that 
accepted the coins; and/or (b) they liked the coin, or in other words, they obtained some 
sort of psychological benefit from having the coin.  The existence of such a core of 
consumers will overcome the network externalities, however, only when it leads to what 
Professors Shapiro and Varian refer to as a virtuous cycle of positive feedback: a situation 
where other consumers and merchants adopt the product —here the coin —because they 
believe that others are also adopting the product.  See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 16, 
at 173–77. 
92 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 
(1990). 
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in some cases, an entrepreneur who can innovate a way to profit from 
the creation of a platform will find ways to internalize the network 
externalities in order to facilitate adoption of the technology.93  An 
example of this, again, is the growth of both the charge card and the 
credit card industries over the past fifty years.  In the first part of the 
story, charge cards went through a period of rapid growth following 
the creation of the Diners Club card because the founders of that card 
realized they could make profits by extracting a high merchant 
discount fee averaging seven percent and giving the card to 
consumers at a fairly low cost, including a five-dollar annual fee.94  In 
other words, Diners Club, and then American Express, was able to 
internalize the costs of getting the cards into the hands of consumers 
by extracting higher profits from merchants.95 
In the second part of the story, credit cards became one of the 
dominant U.S. payment forms when credit card issuers learned that 
they could profit from the credit function of a credit card, allowing 
the company to offer the payment service of the card at a lower price.  
This bundling of products — the payment product and the credit 
product —was not enough, however.  The second important 
innovation was the improvements in the revolving credit industry 
allowing credit card issuers to make greater profits from the issuance 
of such credit.  Essentially, this created what might be seen as a three-
sided platform market involving merchants and two types of 
consumers: those who are only transacting and those who are 
financing.  Credit card issuers also became more sophisticated in 
marketing their credit products and in their ability to decide to whom 
they should extend credit and under what terms.96  These innovations 
allowed them to nearly eliminate annual fees, cut the costs charged to 
merchants, and expand the contexts in which such cards could be 
used.97  In other words, credit cards grew as a payment system 
because card issuers could extract more profits from consumers using 
 
93 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 136. 
94 Id. at 54–55, 59 (noting that the fee in 1958 dollars was five dollars).  At the time, 
Diners Club earned roughly seventy percent of its revenues from merchants.  Id. at 54–55. 
95 Id. at 150. 
96 See Bar-Gill, supra note 33, at 1388–94 (describing methods card issuers use to 
market cards to consumers). 
97 For instance, in the 1990s, Visa and Mastercard each revoked their long-standing rule 
that a credit card could only be used in transactions where the card was physically present.  
John D. Muller, Selected Developments in the Law of Cyberspace Payments, 54 BUS. 
LAW. 403 n.26 (1998) (citing Esther Shein, Credit Card Companies SET to Charge, PC 
WEEK ONLINE (Apr. 20, 1998), http:// www.zdnet.com/pcweek/news/0420/20set.html). 
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the cards for financing services and thereby cut the costs of the cards 
to purely transacting parties, which led to more merchants accepting 
the cards.98 
The obvious question that arises, then, is why did the market not 
solve the problem for the Susan B. Anthony dollar in the same way it 
did for credit cards?  The answer, at least in the case of the Susan B. 
Anthony dollar, is that the profit opportunities for overcoming the 
network externalities were close to nonexistent.  There were no 
widely available additional products that could be bundled with the 
coin to underwrite its adoption.99  Moreover, the government — t he 
supplier of this particular multi-sided platform — could not subsidize 
one side of the platform by extracting extra payments from another 
side.  Of course, the government could have paid merchants or 
consumers to use the coin, but the complete absence of discussion on 
that possibility suggests that it is beyond the pale.100 
The strategy adopted by the credit card issuers is not the only way 
for a party to try to overcome network externalities and promote a 
new technology.  As Professors Shapiro and Varian point out, there 
are two basic ways to internalize switching costs.  The first is to 
reduce those costs by making it easier to switch products.  This was 
the method used by the charge card industry to get consumers to 
adopt the cards in the 1950s and ’60s.  The second way is to increase 
the benefits available from the new network, thereby making the 
 
98 In their book, Evans and Schmalensee ignore this second story because —we 
assume — they see the financing function as separate from the transacting function of 
credit cards.  See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 150.  While we agree 
with Evans and Schmalensee that charge cards arose initially in reaction to the platform 
created by Diners Club and that the financing function was separate from the transaction 
function, we reject the implicit notion that bundling the financing and transaction function 
has had no effect on the industry.  We remain convinced that the growth of credit cards 
over the past twenty-five years has been a direct result of the credit function helping to 
subsidize the transaction function.  See MANN, supra note 14, at 86–92. 
99 It is not impossible to imagine a hypothetical product that might do this.  Say, for 
instance, that a vendor stood to make significantly more profits if consumers switched 
from using quarters to the Susan B. Anthony coin.  Imagine a soda company whose 
products cost one dollar.  Also suppose that the soda company, by fostering use of the 
Susan B. Anthony dollar, might save large amounts in the collection and transportation of 
coins from vending machines such that it is willing to give consumers a discount for 
purchasing with a dollar coin rather than with another assortment of change.  Under these 
circumstances, the soda vendor’s decision might give consumers sufficient incentive to 
adopt the coin that it initiates a cycle of positive feedback leading to widespread adoption 
of the coin, particularly if other vendors did the same thing. 
100 In truth, the government already subsidizes all forms of currency in its role as 
fiduciary.  See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 30 (noting that “many of the 
costs of cash are hidden in the government’s budget”). 
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benefits of the switch outweigh its costs.101  Increased benefits may 
make a technology essentially irresistible to one side.  For instance, 
restaurants and hotels accepted charge cards despite the quite high 
initial discount fees because the cards attracted well-heeled 
customers.  Similarly, DVD providers have included all sorts of 
additional features to make DVDs more attractive to consumers than 
the VHS tapes they replaced.  Thus, in our example of the Susan B. 
Anthony coin, the government might still have succeeded if it was 
putting forth a product that had much greater benefits for both 
consumers and merchants.  But in reality, the coin was not a radical 
improvement from the perspective of either group and therefore was 
doomed to failure. 
D.  Withdrawing Alternative Technologies 
When government is unable to provide strong incentives or the 
technology does not offer comparatively greater advantages for both 
consumers and merchants, the government can ensure a particular 
technology’s success by eliminating or severely curtailing its 
competition.  For instance, several G-7 countries have succeeded in 
introducing high-denomination coins by withdrawing the competing 
currency.102  As another example, the euro became the currency of 
many European Union countries after each country withdrew its 
national coins and notes at a time when many citizens in the twelve-
member countries would have preferred not to have the euro in the 
first instance.103  The United States itself has — for all practical 
 
101 Professors Shapiro and Varian refer to these approaches as (a) the evolution strategy 
of compatibility and (b) the revolution strategy of compelling performance.  SHAPIRO & 
VARIAN, supra note 16, at 190–91.  They later clarify, however, that the evolution strategy 
“centers on reducing switching costs so that consumers can gradually try your new 
technology,” id. at 192, and that the revolution strategy focuses on “offer[ing] a product so 
much better than what people are using that enough users will bear the pain of switching to 
it,” id. at 195. 
 Evans and Schmalensee similarly suggest that two ways to solve the problem are to cut 
the price for one side or to “invest in one side of the market.”  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, 
supra note 7, at 143.  Obviously, cutting the financial costs or even paying a party to adopt 
a new system is a way to reduce the switching cost, whereas we see decisions to invest in 
the market as a way for a system supplier to offer a better product to that side of the 
market. 
102 MARKETING CAMPAIGN, supra note 69, at 20.  These countries include Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan.  Id. 
103 See generally GALLUP EUROPE, FLASH EUROBAROMETER 115: Euro Attitudes 
(wave 6) – Euro Zone (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public 
_opinion/flash/fl115_en.pdf. 
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purposes — eliminated competing payment forms at least twice in its 
history.  The passage of the legal tender provision in 1862 meant that 
creditors had to accept greenbacks in satisfaction of a debt, even 
though they preferred to be paid in coin.104  Similarly, in 1863, the 
United States issued national bank notes, which faced stiff 
competition from state bank notes.  Congress countered the 
competitive threat by placing a ten percent tax on the issuance of the 
state notes.105  The tax made issuance of state notes virtually 
prohibitive, and they quickly disappeared from circulation.106  As 
these examples illustrate, eliminating the competing payment system 
ensures that the new alternative will flourish; consumers and 
merchants simply have no choice but to use the alternative. 
Withdrawing or severely curtailing the competing technology 
carries particular risks for the government.  These sorts of actions are 
what the social norms literature calls “hard shoves.”107  That is, rather 
than using a series of incremental measures to gradually convince 
individuals about the merits of the new payment form, the 
government simply forces the public’s hand.  When it comes to hard 
shoves, social norms literature has focused on the risk that individuals 
will react by either declining to follow or enforce the law that is the 
subject of the hard shove.  This in turn creates a “self-reinforcing 
wave of resistance” that solidifies whatever preferences the 
government is attempting to change.108  Once a government 
withdraws or severely curtails a technology, however, no self-
reinforcing wave of resistance is possible.  Individuals cannot insist 
on using the technology that the government has — for all practical 
purposes — eliminated.  In effect, the government has achieved 100% 
compliance with and enforcement of its own preferences. 
 
104 Gold quickly rose to a premium against greenbacks during the inflationary period of 
the Civil War, at one point reaching a high of 185%.  Thus, creditors who were forced to 
accept greenbacks received less than the market equivalent in other goods or monies.  See 
generally Farley Grubb, The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the 
1787 Constitutional Convention and How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation’s 
Monetary System Emerged 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
11783, 2005). 
105 HARRY D. HUTCHINSON, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 
51 (4th ed.) 
106 Id. 
107 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 619–20 (2000). 
108 Id. at 608. 
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A government that uses heavy-handed measures to promote a 
particular technology does not have to worry about preference 
backlash, but it does have to concern itself with political 
consequences.  This is the perfectly obvious observation that 
politicians are held accountable by their constituents.  Former German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for instance, writes in his memoir that he 
forced the euro on the German people against their will and that they 
voted him out of office because of it.109  Similarly, many 
commentators believe that the Netherlands voted to reject the 
European Constitution in part because of widespread dissatisfaction 
with the euro.110  As another example, in the next section we discuss 
congressional efforts to replace analog television with digital.  After 
the public failed to embrace digital TV, the government decided to 
legislate a date on which it would shut down the analog signal, 
thereby causing all TVs without digital technology to go black.  As 
the blackout date approached and few Americans had adopted the 
requisite technology, Congress extended the date by three years.111  
As one newspaper put it, “[f]ew politicians want to be blamed if 
viewers can’t watch TV.”112 
Governments engaging in hard shoves have the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the promoted innovation genuinely benefits either 
the country as a whole or significant numbers of its citizens, or that 
the innovation is necessary to serve some larger purpose.  The 
architects of the legal tender provision, for example, may have 
perceived it as necessary to preserve the solvency of big commercial 
banks, which would in turn allow for the sale of government bonds to 
help finance the Civil War.113  The European governments that 
adopted the euro believed a common currency would result in 
economic strength; in time, their citizens will learn whether these 
governments were right. 
Because withdrawal or curtailment of a competing technology 
steamrolls over public preferences, it is the most heavy-handed 
measure that government can take.  Whether the government is 
 
109 HELMUT KOHL, MEIN TAGEBUCH 178 (2000). 
110 Marlise Simons, Dutch Expected to Vote No on European Charter Today, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A8. 
111 See infra notes 115–24 and accompanying text. 
112 Amy Schatz, Crossing the Digital Television Divide— A s Congress Seeks Deadline 
for Mandate, Some Viewers Could Be Left in the Dark, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2005, at A4. 
113 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 408–10 
(explaining why the legal tender provision was advantageous for commercial banks). 
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willing to use this strategy —or to instead choose one of the others 
outlined in this section— d epends largely on whether it is acting as 
fiduciary, seller, or lawmaker.  Because every government entity 
would prefer not to anger or alienate its constituents, it seeks to spark 
change by the gentlest possible means.  But when providing 
information or addressing particular concerns proves ineffective, 
government has to do more.  As our discussion of the Susan B. 
Anthony illustrates,114 when government is acting as fiduciary, it 
lacks the profit opportunities that enable it to effectively incentivize 
use of the new payment form.  Thus, withdrawal or severe curtailment 
of the competing form is the only available strategy.  In contrast, 
when the government is acting as seller, it will directly realize the 
cost-savings associated with a particular technology.  These savings 
allow the government to offer incentives aimed at overcoming strong 
individual preferences and network effects.  Finally, when 
government is acting as lawmaker, it is most likely to provide 
information, address particularized concerns, and leave the 
incentivizing to third-party institutions that stand to gain from the 
public making a switch.  Moreover, when third-party institutions will 
be the biggest winners, politicians are likely to be most reticent about 
hard shoves that risk angering their constituents. 
IV 
GOVERNMENT ACTION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS 
Although predicting what is on the horizon for new technologies is 
a tricky endeavor, we are confident that inventors will continue to 
create and that entrepreneurs will continue to bring those innovations 
to market.  We are also confident that some of these innovators will 
seek government support.  The critical question is whether the 
government should make this support available. 
As Parts II and III illustrate, the government can use a number of 
tools to promote the adoption and use of a particular technology.  But 
government intervention tends to be inadvisable for three reasons.  
First, technology moves quickly and the government usually moves 
slowly.  As such, by the time the government intervenes, the “new” 
technology it seeks to support might already be on its way out.  
Second, with a bit of time, technologies that are sufficiently 
 
114 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
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advantageous to the consumer are likely to flourish, and thus 
governmental intervention is ultimately unnecessary.  Third, and 
finally, such intervention may have the unintended consequence of 
undermining the incentive to invest in new technologies in the first 
instance. 
A.  Plodding Governments and Rapidly Moving Technologies 
The United States’s thirty-year-long foray into digital TV 
illustrates the political process point.  Terrestrial broadcasters— i n 
contrast to cable and satellite providers — traditionally have used an 
analog signal.  Technology has existed since the 1980s that would 
allow terrestrial broadcasters to replace this analog signal with a 
digital one.  The United States has always been acutely interested in 
this switch.  With the passage of time, some of the reasons for this 
interest have faded,115 but one continues to loom large: a digital 
signal requires much less spectrum than an analog signal.  The 
liberated spectrum — that is, the freed-up public airwaves —will be 
auctioned off by the U.S. government, most likely for use in wireless 
telecommunications services.116  Digital TV thus promises to help 
raise vast sums of public dollars and ease the spectrum shortage that 
has emerged with the spread of wireless communications. 
Since its creation, however, digital TV has faced the same sort of 
chicken-and-egg problem that the Susan B. Anthony and credit cards 
faced, albeit on a much more complicated scale.  Digital TV requires 
different equipment than analog in both the broadcasters who send the 
signal and the televisions that receive it.  The government initially 
thought that both consumers and broadcasters would readily make the 
switch, because doing so would allow consumers to watch television 
in HD, which has substantially better picture quality than other 
alternatives.  But before broadcasters can transmit in HD and 
consumers can watch it, networks have to produce shows in an HD 
format.  Herein lies the problem, because 
[n]etworks have balked at producing high-definition programming, 
arguing that there aren’t enough outlets that transmit such shows or 
enough viewers with the necessary technology to watch them.  
 
115 In the 1980s, the United States saw digital TV as a means to revitalize its consumer 
electronic industry and promote other high-tech industries.  HERNAN GALPERIN, NEW 
TELEVISION, OLD POLITICS 13–14 (W. Lance Bennett & Robert M. Entman eds., 2004).  
In the 1990s, digital TV became part of “wide-reaching policy agenda” to “turn the TV set 
into a home gateway for digital services” in nations across the world.  Id. at 14. 
116 Id. at 15. 
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Local affiliates and viewers, meanwhile, have been reluctant to 
invest in the necessary technology, on the grounds that there isn’t 
enough quality programming.  And cable and satellite carriers, 
which already carry broadcasters’ analog programming, have been 
reluctant to provide additional space for the broadcasters’ digital 
programming, which often is merely a digitized version of their 
analog shows.117 
In other words, the move to digital TV stalled because of collective 
inaction within this particular multi-sided platform. 
Because the U.S. government has an interest in auctioning a freed-
up spectrum and because the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) regulates “who can broadcast what, to whom, at what prices, 
and using which technology, particularly in the terrestrial . . . 
sector,”118 one might have expected the FCC to use a few hard shoves 
to speed the move to digital TV.  In fact, however, government 
initiatives have been “either absent or ineffectual.”119  Most notably, 
legislation passed in 1997 set a deadline of December 31, 2006, for 
shutting down all analog television channels but allowed a television 
station to receive an extension if fewer than eighty-five percent of 
households in its market had access to digital signals.120  By mid-
2005, less than four percent of households had TVs that were capable 
of receiving such a signal.  In February 2006, Congress acknowledged 
that the move to digital had floundered and passed new legislation 
that set a hard deadline of February 17, 2009.121  The new law also 
provided up to two forty-dollar coupons per household to be used 
toward purchasing digital to analog signal converters.122  Then, only 
two weeks before the February 17 deadline, Congress postponed the 
switch for another four months, to June 2009.123  As this Article goes 
to press, television viewers are being bombarded by public service 
announcements about how to prepare for the switch to digital.  
 
117 Kathy Chen, FCC Lays Out Plan to Facilitate Digital TV, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 
2002, at B5. 
118 GALPERIN, supra note 115, at 6. 
119 Joel Brinkley, Digital TV Era Still Remains Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2000, at C1. 
120 Evan Kwerel & Jonathan Levy, The DTV Transition in the US, in DIGITAL 
BROADCASTING: POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THE AMERICAS, EUROPE AND JAPAN 25, 25–
26 (Martin Cave & Kiyoshi Nakamura eds., 2006). 
121 47 U.S.C. § 337 (2008). 
122 Kwerel & Levy, supra note 120,. at 34. 
123 Brian Stelter, Switch to Digital TV Wins a Delay to June 12, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2009, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/business/media/ 
05digital.html?scp=2&sq=digitaltelevision&st=cse. 
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Whether Congress is able to stick with the June 2009 deadline 
remains to be seen. 
The American experience with digital TV sharply contrasts with 
that of other countries, most notably the United Kingdom, where the 
transition to digital TV is nearly complete.124  Professor Hernan 
Galperin has identified a number of reasons why the United Kingdom 
was able to succeed where the United States has failed.  Among them 
is a basic point about the American political system: 
 The organization of the state . . . militates against regime change 
and policy innovations.  The system is devised to curb discretionary 
government behavior through structural division of power and 
formalized checks. . . .  Such fragmentation offers organized 
interests a myriad of access points into policymaking, and each of 
them represents a potential veto.      . . .  Gridlock and poor 
coordination are thus commonplace in American regulatory politics.  
This does not rule out the possibility of regime change, but such 
change is likely to be slow and politically contentious.125 
Because technology changes quickly, the American system may be 
particularly ill-equipped to meaningfully promote particular 
applications. 
Check 21,126 the 2004 legislation allowing banks to substitute 
electronic copies of checks for paper originals, is a case in point.  This 
legislation aimed to tilt consumer preferences toward electronic 
checks in three ways.  First, as with the legal tender statute, Check 21 
overrides consumer preferences: even if a bank or consumer would 
prefer to receive the original check, they cannot insist upon it.127  
Second, the law provides a special procedure that allows a consumer 
to request a refund for any loss that occurs if a substitute check is 
incorrectly posted to her account.128  Third, and finally, Check 21 
requires that electronic substitute checks contain the legend, “This is a 
legal copy of your check.  You can use it the same way you would use 
the original check.”129  Check 21 therefore uses several of the tools 
discussed in Part III: it provides information, addresses particular 
 
124 See generally GALPERIN, supra note 115, at 129–226 (describing the United 
Kingdom’s aggressive approach to digital TV). 
125 Id. at 255–56. 
126 12 U.S.C. § 5003 (2008). 
127 Id. § 5003(a). 
128 Id. § 5006(a)(1)(B)(i). 
129 Id. § 5003(b)(2). 
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concerns, and employs the hard shove of requiring the acceptance of 
substitute checks. 
As a legal matter, of course, no law was necessary to allow banks 
to exchange electronic checks.  Prior to the passage of Check 21, no 
statute said that banks had to present paper checks to other banks for 
collection.  Even in the wake of Check 21, the law is silent on the 
form of technology used to exchange checks.  Check 21 simply 
provides that banks can no longer require that the original check be 
returned to them.  Instead, they have to accept some sort of electronic 
substitute. 
Congress aimed the legislation at remedying a variant on the 
classic network effects problem.  Before a bank would be willing to 
invest in electronic truncation, other banks also had to invest in the 
technology; the technology would be useless unless other banks were 
using it as well.  Presumably, given the billions of dollars that 
electronic truncation was expected to save the banking industry, the 
technology would have eventually caught on.  But there was one 
additional complication: consumers who like receiving back their 
original checks.130  Banks, left to themselves, might have quickly 
migrated to electronic truncation.  But some banks were concerned 
that they would lose customers if they, but not their competitors, 
switched to electronic truncation.  The problem was thus that the 
entrenched preferences of some consumers gave banks little incentive 
to move to the new system, even though it promised large savings.  
Furthermore, at least at the time that Check 21 passed, no 
intermediary had emerged to internalize the switching costs. 
Into this quagmire came Congress.  In Check 21, the government 
solved the consumer preferences problem by applying what amounted 
to a hard shove.  No matter where a consumer banked, she could not 
be guaranteed the return of her original checks because her bank 
could not insist upon the return of the original from other financial 
institutions.  In addition, through the use of the legend, Congress 
attempted to educate consumers about the legal status of electronic 
checks and their printouts.  The key, however, was the hard shove. 
What is complicated about this story is that the hard shove does not 
appear either necessary or successful.  Even without Check 21, a 
significant percentage of check payments were likely to migrate to 
 
130 One further complication was that in the two states in which Revised Articles 3 and 
4 have not yet been adopted —N ew York and South Carolina — c onsumers retained a 
statutory right to receive their paper checks back. 
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electronic payments as a result of accounts receivable check 
conversion (“ARC”).  In the ARC process, a creditor takes a check 
written by a consumer and uses it as an authorization to initiate an 
electronic direct debit from the consumer’s account (in other words, a 
payment flowing in the opposite direction of a direct deposit).  
Consumers are given some form of notice that the company will be 
engaging in the practice and the opportunity to opt out, but very few 
do.131  In 2004, more than a billion checks were converted to ARC 
payments,132 and in 2005, the amount was more than 1.6 billion.133  
In addition, another 160 million checks were converted to electronic 
payments at the point of sale in what are known as point of purchase 
(“POP”) transactions.  In POP transactions, the consumer presents a 
check to a merchant, who then uses the check to initiate a direct debit 
from the consumer’s checking account using the bank routing number 
and the account number found on the bottom line of the check.  The 
merchant then returns the check to the consumer as a receipt.134  
Given the explosive growth in such alternatives to check truncation, it 
is far from clear that Check 21 was necessary. 
In fact, to date, the scant evidence suggests that Check 21 has been 
particularly unsuccessful.  For instance, in an April 2005 Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City publication, the authors conceded that 
widespread electronic clearing of checks had not yet occurred and 
that, under existing conditions, electronic truncation was more 
expensive than paper check processing.135  Another report by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago suggested that, nine months after 
passage, only one percent of the checks processed by the Federal 
Reserve Banks were substitute checks.136  Assuming this number is 
 
131 See NACHA, Consumers Have More Protection with Check Conversion, NACHA 
Reports to Congress, Apr. 20, 2005, http://www.nacha.org/news/news/ 
pressreleases/2005/Pr042005/pr042005.htm. 
132 Id. 
133 See NACHA statistics releases, available at http://www.nacha.org/news/Stats/ 
stats2005/2nd%20Quarter%202005.pdf (first and second quarters); http://www 
.nacha.org/news/Stats/stats2005/4th%20Quarter%202005.pdf (third and fourth quarters). 
134 MANN & WINN, supra note 8, at 559–60. 
135 Larry Taft & Nathan Halmrast, Early Experiences with Check 21, PAYMENT 
SYSTEM RES. BRIEFING 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Kan. City, Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/PSR/Briefings/PSR-BriefingApril05.pdf. 
136 See Tara Rice, Implementing the Check 21 Act: Potential Risks Facing Banks 3 
(Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Chi. Fed. Letter No. 217, Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflaugust2005_217.pdf. 
 Apparently, the few checks that are presently converted are of particularly high value, 
for they account for ten percent of the total value of checks.  Id.  This development is in 
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correct, only about 130 million checks were converted.  That number 
obviously pales in comparison to the number of ARC transactions.  
To date, it seems that Congressional efforts to push electronic 
truncation have failed.  Check 21 may have been important when the 
legislation was first proposed, but by the time it actually passed, 
alternative technologies emerged that made electronic truncation far 
less important than banks had predicted.137 
B.  Advantageous Products Do Not Need Government Help 
As Check 21 illustrates, the technology that government seeks to 
promote may be significantly less relevant by the time government 
actually acts.  Another possibility is that the technology the 
government seeks to promote will remain important, so much so that 
it will eventually take off on its own.  An example from Europe, again 
in the payments arena, illustrates this point. 
A giro is the European equivalent of a check. 138  Getting 
consumers and merchants to switch from paper-based transactions, 
such as checks or giros, to electronic payments results in significant 
social economic benefits.139  As such, a switch to electronic payments 
is to a country’s economic advantage.  In addition, we can assume 
that most merchants prefer electronic payment systems because they 
 
itself somewhat disconcerting.  As the author notes, banks are probably converting larger-
value checks rather than lower-value checks because the bank can obtain “the float earned 
off the earlier availability of funds.”  Id.  Because the banks have no obligation to pass 
these savings on to customers, see id. at 4 n.5, Check 21 simply presents banks with an 
opportunity to gain additional profits with no improvement in services for customers. 
137 A Wall Street Journal article suggests that Check 21 is facilitating the use of ATM 
machines that can create a digital image of a check, thereby enabling the consumer to use a 
“no envelope” deposit.  There is no indication, however, that Congress foresaw this 
development, which underscores the point that the government is usually ill-suited to 
predict how technologies will develop.  Robin Sidel & Ian McDonald, The Envelope-Free 
ATM; Banks Are Testing Versions to Read Checks, Count Cash; Twizzlers Wrapper is 
Rejected, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2006, at B1. 
138 A giro is a transaction in which the consumer issues a directive to her bank to pay a 
particular creditor.  It is frequently distinguished from a check as a “push” rather than a 
“pull” transaction: whereas a check requires the creditor to go to the consumer’s bank and 
request payment (i.e., pull funds from the consumer’s account), in a giro transaction, the 
money is sent to the creditor’s account as a result of the consumer directing her own bank 
to make the payment (i.e., the consumer has pushed funds from her account to that of the 
creditor).  A giro transaction bears a great deal of similarity to the direct deposit 
transactions through which many employees are now paid. 
139 David Humphrey et al., Benefits from a Changing Payment Technology in European 
Banking, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 1631, 1632–33 (suggesting possible savings of up to 1% 
of national GDP, and documenting average savings of 0.38% of national GDP). 
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receive their money more quickly.  But European countries vary 
widely in the extent to which consumers make electronic payments.  
For instance, in the Netherlands, the vast majority of noncash 
payments (by value) are made by electronic “credit transfers,” which 
are essentially electronic giro payments.140  Such payments are rarer 
in Greece141 and Portugal.142  Instead, Greeks have continued to use 
checks and paper-based giros for the vast bulk of payments and have 
adopted credit cards in large numbers for small-value transactions.  In 
Portugal, the data suggests that checks, but not paper-based giros, 
compete with electronic giros for payments.  These national 
differences are no doubt the result of both historical patterns of 
making payments as well as the price structure of various payment 
forms. 
With regard to the price structure of payments, the story is familiar: 
banks expect that consumers will respond to price incentives.  That is, 
banks anticipate that consumers will use electronic alternatives if they 
are cheaper than the paper equivalent.  But consumers rarely pay 
directly for such services.  Instead, they pay indirectly through the 
loss of the “float” on paper checks or through lower interest on 
account balances.  No bank wants to be the first—and possibly only—
institution to start directly charging customers for services they had 
previously perceived as free.143  Again, the issue is a variant of the 
classic network effects problem.  So how can one country make the 
switch more quickly than another? 
Between 1990 and 2004, Norway and the Netherlands experienced 
significant changes in the way that consumers paid for point-of-sale 
transactions.144  Electronic payments, however, took off more quickly 
in Norway than in the Netherlands because Norwegian customers 
were charged a per-transaction fee for using both electronic and paper 
payment systems, with electronic transactions being generally 
cheaper.145  Norwegian banks overcame the risk of losing customers 
 
140 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BLUE BOOK: PAYMENT AND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IN THE ACCEDING COUNTRIES 245–46 (2006) 
(26% of payments and 85.6% value of payments in 2004), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/bluebook2006addenden.pdf. 
141 Id. at 155–56 (7.5% of payments and 11.8% of value of payments in 2004). 
142 Id. at 271–72 (6.2% of payments and 54.3% of value of payments in 2004). 
143 See Wilko Bolt et al., The Effect of Transaction Pricing on the Adoption of 
Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country Comparison 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working 
Paper No. 05-28, 2005), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2005/ wp05-28.pdf. 
144 Id. at 3. 
145 Id. at 2, 4 tbl.1. 
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by coordinating the timing of when per-transaction fees would 
begin.146  While ordinarily this sort of collusion would draw the 
attention of antitrust officials,147 Norwegian officials decided to do 
nothing to prevent it.  Indeed, Norway’s central bank encouraged per-
transaction fees.  Not surprisingly, Norwegian consumers reacted to 
the price incentive by moving away from the old system to the new. 
But while change did not happen quite as rapidly in the 
Netherlands as in Norway, it still occurred.  In other words, even 
without a price incentive and the coordination that made the incentive 
possible, Dutch consumers eventually adopted the new payment 
systems.  For instance, per-person use of electronic giro payments in 
Norway grew twelve percent annually between 1990 and 2004; per-
person use of electronic giro payments grew seven percent annually in 
the Netherlands during the same time period.148  But in both 
countries, paper checks had almost entirely disappeared by 2004.  
Dutch and Norwegian consumers had replaced them with electronic 
giros payments, debit cards, and cash that was usually withdrawn 
through an ATM.149 
The similarity of the check replacement rates in Norway and the 
Netherlands suggests that, in some instances, the technology the 
government seeks to promote would have taken off without any 
legislative push, particularly if the technology is sufficiently 
advantageous to consumers and merchants.  If the legislation prompts 
no change beyond what the market would have accomplished in its 
own time, then government resources are better spent elsewhere. 
C.  Stifling Competition 
There is a third reason why government should refrain from 
promoting particular technologies: intervention may stifle industry 
competition and thereby decrease innovation and the offering of 
special incentives.  Market competition leads to useful innovation.  
For example, although the United States has not yet been able to 
switch from analog to digital, it did win the race to create the first 
digital TV system.  This success stems from the approach the United 
States took toward the technology: rather than mandate an HDTV 
 
146 Id. at 2. 
147 The banks did not coordinate the amount of per-transaction fees, which could be 
zero.  Id. 
148 Id. at 5. 
149 Id. at 3–4. 
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standard like many of its industrial counterparts did, the United States 
took a more flexible approach that promoted research into new ways 
of compressing HD signals.150  When the government enacts 
legislation relating to technology, it risks decreasing innovation. 
Consider the market for payments by cell phone, which have 
already taken hold in parts of Asia.  Providers are immensely 
interested in convincing consumers to use their cell phones to make 
payments and have begun to experiment with such services.151  A 
lack of interoperability, however, could prevent consumers from 
migrating toward cell phone payments.  Issues could arise at two 
different levels.  First, different cell phone companies may develop 
different transaction technologies, with the result that only some cell 
phones will work in one location to make a payment, while other cell 
phones will work in another location.  Second, cell phone companies 
may differ in what payment services they are willing to offer to 
customers.  One company might allow its customers to select among 
accounts from which to make payments, while another company may 
require that customers only make payments through a credit card, 
perhaps even a particular bank’s credit card.  As a result, payment 
providers are likely to seek that the government require new payment 
systems operators to increase interoperability. 
Just as the Federal Reserve and banking interests sought 
congressional aid in mandating the acceptance of substitute checks, 
payments industry parties may seek assistance in gaining consumers’ 
acceptance of a particular cell phone technology.  In Hong Kong, for 
instance, nearly ninety-five percent of the population carries the 
Octopus card, which is a stored-value card that, like E-ZPass, uses 
RFID technology.152  One of the main factors in the phenomenal 
success of the Octopus card was the formation of a joint venture by 
the five largest public transportation providers to support the creation 
of a card that would work on all of their lines.153  Similarly, the 
success of smart cards154 in Europe has been tied to the willingness of 
 
150 GALPERIN, supra note 115, at 246. 
151 A Cash Call, supra note 5, at 71–73. 
152 See Carol L. Clark, Shopping Without Cash: The Emergence of the E-Purse, ECON. 
PERSP. (4th Quarter 2005), at 34, 36. 
153 Id. at 37.  In contrast, Carol Clark notes that two similar systems launched by 
competing bus companies in Macau failed to succeed because of the lack of 
interoperability.  Id. 
154 A “smart card” generally refers to any payment card that has a microchip containing 
a consumer’s information embedded in the card.  In Europe, smart card technology has 
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state telephone companies to mandate the use of smart cards for pay 
phones.155  For cell phone payment schemes to work in the United 
States, interoperability is similarly likely to be crucial.  Only 
interoperability can provide sufficient benefits to satisfy the 
heterogeneous preferences of a critical mass of consumers, which will 
in turn induce merchants to accept cell phone payments. 
An effective means of increasing the possibility of a critical mass is 
for the government to mandate a particular payment technology.156  
Such a move would, of course, limit consumer choice among possible 
products.  For instance, Cingular has tested a product in Atlanta that 
uses special RFID chips in cell phone handset covers to allow 
customers to make payments at Philips Arena.157  In this product, the 
chip connects the cell phone with the customer’s “existing Chase 
credit card accounts.”158  Paypal encourages consumers to use their 
cell phones to send money from their Paypal accounts to friends and 
relatives.159  A similar product is Obopay, which provides consumers 
with software that allows them to receive and make various payments 
via their phone.160  Given such an abundance of mutually exclusive 
systems, smaller existing payment providers might pressure the 
government to ensure that these new services provide access to not 
just particular accounts, but to all of a consumer’s credit and/or 
deposit accounts.161  On its face, such governmental intervention is 
appealing because it would make such products attractive to a wider 
variety of consumers and thereby increase the likelihood of adoption. 
 
primarily been used to embed a PIN on a microchip located on a credit card, which the 
consumer then confirms when making a purchase with the card. 
155 SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 16, at 244. 
156 Note that the other possibilities for government action we discussed in Part III are 
unlikely to be useful in this context. 
157 Eric Dash & Ken Belson, Ring Up My Bill, Please: Mobile Payment via Cellphone, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at C1. 
158 Id. 
159 For information on the service, see Paypal.com, Send Money By Phone —Anytime, 
From Anywhere, https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=xpt/ 
mobile/MobileSend-outside (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
160 In the Obopay system, the phone itself is not used to make retail payments. Instead, 
the customer uses a special debit card that is linked to the Obopay account. See Press 
Release, Obopay, Obopay Unveils First Comprehensive Mobile Payment Service in U.S. 
(Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.obopay.com/corporate/ 
press_releases/pr_33006.shtml. 
161 Cf. Dash & Belson, supra note 157 (noting that big card issuers would prefer to limit 
access to accounts). 
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The rub is that the success of such systems is likely to require not 
just attractive services, but also the use of incentives.162  For example, 
Obopay presently gives new users ten dollars in their account just for 
signing up.  Incentives are costs, which need to be internalized by 
someone, most likely the existing payment providers.  And if those 
providers are not guaranteed exclusive access to customers, they may 
decide not to invest in the first place.  In this context, government 
interference may not increase consumer choice, but instead 
undermine it. 
Moreover, the stronger the governmental shove toward a particular 
technology, the greater the risk that the government will stifle 
competition within the industry.  For example, because cell phone 
payments currently are not a necessity, there is competitive pressure 
for payment providers to entice consumers and merchants with 
special incentives and services.  Payment providers also have an 
impetus to continue to develop new technologies that expand the 
appeal of their products.  Any governmental action that forces a 
particular technology upon consumers and merchants is likely to stifle 
these innovations and incentives because they will no longer be 
necessary to ensure the technology’s widespread adoption and use.  
The potential for stifling competition, then, is another reason why 
government should rarely intervene to promote a new technology. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In a digital world, the number of networked technologies will 
increase dramatically.  Beyond the examples we discuss in this 
Article, there are operating systems for computers and other devices 
and network standards for cell phones, to name just a few.  The 
success of such technologies will turn on the ability of their promoters 
to gain adoption from a wide variety of users.  Given the large 
investments at stake, businesses are likely to put a great deal of 
pressure on the government to take a role in assisting or even 
promoting particular technologies. 
As we have argued, however, the government generally should do 
nothing.  Market participants are usually better positioned than the 
government to bring about the necessary coordination for a 
technology to succeed.  Even when the market may have trouble 
coordinating for a particular technology, there is still good reason to 
 
162 See also Clark, supra note 152, at 37, 38 (noting the importance of incentives). 
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be skeptical that the government will decide to invest in the right 
technology, move in a timely enough fashion, or act without causing 
collateral damage. 
None of this is to say that the government should have no role.  
Clearly, government support in the form of legislation that clarifies 
the rules for already-dominant technologies can create additional 
efficiencies for society.  But even here, the government must be 
careful not to prop up failing technologies (for example, electronic 
checks) at a time when more efficient technologies (for example, 
direct deposits and withdrawals) are taking over.  Government power 
can just as easily distort the market by entrenching an old and failing 
technology as it can aid the adoption of a new technology.  In March 
2008, more than a year shy of the government-engineered switch to 
digital television, newspapers began to report that many Americans 
are abandoning traditional television sets for programming that is 
streamed to their computer screens.163  Hindsight is always 20/20, but 
the accompanying lessons should also be clear: government usually is 
not well-suited to help the public decide which technologies should 
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